


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Winter 1997-98 NO. 81



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Go World News

International News

The 2nd Samsung Cup

For the second time this year, Kobayashi Satoru made it into the finals of a major international tournament. In April, he played Cho Hoon-hyun in the Tong Yang Securities Cup and lost the best-of-five match by a one-sided score of 3-0. In this year's Samsung Cup, he faced the formidable Lee Chang-ho and again he lost 3-0. It must have been a great disappointment to Satoru to have lost out to Korean players twice this year, but most people didn't think that Kobayashi was a match for Lee. (Kobayashi did beat Lee in the semifinals of the Tong Yang Securities Cup. See GW79, page 26.) Lee is getting stronger and stronger. He is only 22 years old and has probably not yet reached the peak of his potential strength. By the time he matures, he may well be invincible.

The games from this match will appear in our next issue. The results:

Game 1 – 97/10/31. Lee won by 5 1/2 points.

Game 2 – 11/26. Kobayashi resigned.

Game 3 – 11/28. Kobayashi resigned.

The 4th China-Korea Team Match

On August 25 and 28, the 4th China-Korea Team Match was held in Shanghai. Each team consisted of seven members playing twice, each time against a different opponent. China won the match 9-5. The results were as follows:

Round 1		
China		Korea
Ma Xiaochun	beat	Mok Jin-seok
Nie Weiping	beat	Cho Hoon-hyun
Chang Hao	beat	Choi Gyu-byung
Zhou Heyang	beat	Cheong Soo-hoon
Luo Xihi	beat	Hong Chong-hyun
Wang Lei	lost to	Lee Chang-ho
Yu Bin	lost to	Yoo Chang-hyuk
Round 2		
Ma Xiaochun	lost to	Lee Chang-ho
Chang Hao	lost to	Cho Hoon-hyun
Luo Xihi	lost to	Mok Jin-seok
Nie Weiping	beat	Hong Chong-hyun
Yu Bin	beat	Cheong Soo-hoon
Zhou Heyang	beat	Yoo Chang-hyuk
Wang Lei	beat	Choi Gyu-byung

Young Japanese Team Victorious Against Korea

It's well known that the Lee Chang-ho-inspired go boom in Korea has led to the emergence of many powerful young players there. In fact, the competition to become a professional is so strong that it's popularly said that the low-ranked players in Korea are stronger than the high-ranked ones. Consequently, a team of ten young Nihon Ki-in players that visited Seoul for the 4th Japan-Korea New Stars Goodwill Series was pleasantly surprised when it won the three-match series 18-12.

Two members of the Japanese team won all three games: Akiyama Jiro 6-dan and Cho U 5-dan. The leader of the team was Oya Koichi 8-dan, who scored 2-1, and Michael Redmond 8-dan was also a member (his score was 1-2). Reflecting the international make-up of the Nihon Ki-in these days, five members of the Japanese team were actually born overseas.

This series is privately arranged between Japanese and Korean study groups, so the games are unofficial. The Japanese victory tied the series to date at 2-all.

The 12th Japan-China Super Go Series

One item that has slipped through our reporting net during 1997 is the newly revamped Japan-China Super Go series. To repair that omission, here is an update.

After Japan lost the 11th Super Go series 2-7 (Chang Hao almost single-handedly disposed of the Japanese team), the sponsor decided to change the knockout team format to one of three individual best-of-three playoffs.

In these matches the Japanese side fields the following three players:

- the winner of the Japanese NEC Cup (he plays the winner of the Chinese NEC Cup)
- the winner of the NEC Young Stars tournament
- the winner of the women's Kakusei tournament

Japan got off to a bad start in the Young Stars match and the women's match, which were held in Shanghai in July. In the first

match, Zhou Heyang 7-dan (age 21) of China defeated Yo Kagen 8-dan (age 27) of Japan (2-1). The games were played on July 20, 22, and 24. Li Chunhua 3-dan (age 24), who won the 1996 Chinese Women's Championship, defeated Nakazawa Ayako 4-dan (age 25). The games were played on July 20 and 22.

In the NEC champions' playoff, held on October 29, 30, and 31, Kato Masao 9-dan of Japan got off to a bad start, losing the first game to Shao Weigang 8-dan, so it looked as if China was going to make a clean sweep of the series. However, Kato recovered to win the next two games.

Since this is considered as the main match of the three, you could say Kato salvaged Japan's honor.

News from Japan

The 22nd Meijin Title Match: Cho Defends His Title Against Kobayashi

Cho Chikun has defended his Meijin title with a score of 4-2 in the best-of-seven title match. By winning the sixth game of the match, played on November 5-6, Cho stopped his most dangerous challenger and life-long rival Kobayashi Koichi. Having rebuffed Kobayashi, who is regarded as Japan's strongest player next to Cho, there doesn't seem to be anyone else who can undo Cho's stranglehold on the top three titles — Kisei, Honinbo, and Meijin.

The match produced some exciting games and fierce middle-game fighting. They will be analyzed in the next issue of *Go World*.

Full results:

Game 1: 9/9/10-11. Cho resigned

Game 2: 9/25. Cho won by 3 1/2 points.

Game 3: 10/1-2. Cho resigned.

Game 4: 10/15-16. Kobayashi resigned.

Game 5: 10/22-23. Cho won by 3 1/2 points.

Game 6: 11/5-6. Cho won by 3 1/2 points.

The 53rd Honinbo League

The players in the 53rd Honinbo league to decide the challenger to Cho Chikun Honinbo have been decided. Making their debuts in the league are Kobayashi Satoru, the former Kisei and Gosei title holder, and Yamada Kimio 7-dan, this year's winner of the Oza title. Kobayashi's failure to win a place in the league previously was sometimes referred to as 'one of the seven wonders of the go world.' Making a comeback are O Rissei and O Meien.

Yamada, who won two titles in 1997, the Oza and the Shinjin-O, has taken an early lead with three wins. The rankings and results (as of December 25) so far are shown in the chart.

The 23rd Meijin League

The players in the 23rd Meijin league to decide the challenger to Cho Chikun Meijin have been decided. Two players, Rin Kaiho and Yoda Norimoto, have won their way back into the league immediately after dropping out. This is Rin's 35th consecutive appearance in the Meijin league, a record not likely to be broken in the near future. The third player to win his way in is Tono Hiroaki 9-dan, a player from the Kansai Ki-in, making his second appearance in this league, the previous one being in 1982.

The 53rd Honinbo League. Title holder: Cho Chikun

Rank		KM	RS	HN	CS	KS	OR	OM	YK	Won	Lost
1	Kato Masao		●				○	●	○	2	2
2	Ryu Shikun	○					●	○		2	1
3	Hikosaka Naoto				○	○			●	2	1
4	Cho Sonjin			●		●			●	0	3
5	Kobayashi Satoru			●	○				●	1	2
5	O Rissei	●	○					●		1	2
5	O Meien	○	●				○			2	1
5	Yamada Kimio	●		○	○	○				3	1

The rankings of the participants in this league are shown in the chart below.

22nd Shinjin-O

Yamada Kimio 7-dan defeated Aoki Kikuyo 7-dan 2-0 to take the 22nd Shinjin-O (King of the New Stars) title on September 24, 1997. This is the first title for Yamada. Aoki is the first female player to challenge for a title open to both men and women. She has won both the Women's Meijin and the Women's Kakusei titles. We hope to be seeing more of her in future open tournaments.

Ryu Shikun's Annus Horribilis

1997 turned out to be Ryu Shikun's *annus horribilis*. From the end of October to the middle of December, he had ten important games, which meant he had to play two games a week. Not only did he have to defend both his Oza and Tengen titles, he also got into the playoff to decide the challenger to the Kisei title. But this success probably just added to the pressure and to his stress by increasing the number of games he had to play. (These one-day title-match games start at 9:00 in the morning and usually last until 10:00 or 11:00 at night.) When the dust finally settled, Ryu had lost both his titles and failed in his bid to become the Kisei challenger.

45th Oza Title Match: Yamada Kimio's First Big-Seven Title

The fall of Ryu Shikun heralded the emergence of a new star on the Japanese go scene. At the age of 25, Yamada Kimio 7-dan has won his first big-seven title by defeating

Ryu Shikun 3-1 in the best-of-five Oza title match. This is the second title Yamada has won this year and the third of his career (in 1993, he won the Shin Etsu tournament). He is the first member of the Kansai (Osaka) branch of the Nihon Ki-in to win a big-seven title. More big things can undoubtedly be expected of him in the future.

The results of the match:

Game 1: 9/7/10/28. Yamada won by 4 1/2 points.

Game 2: 11/10. Yamada resigned.

Game 3: 11/20. Yamada won by 1 1/2 points.

Game 4: 11/27. Yamada won by 5 1/2 points.

22nd Tengen Title Match: Kudo Norio Captures the Title at the Age of 57

With the emergence of all the strong young players in Japanese tournaments, the success in the Tengen title match of a not-so-prominent 57-year-old player came as the big surprise of the year. Although Kudo Norio has not been in the limelight recently, his career is not without success: in 1977 he took the Oza title from Cho Chikun. He has also appeared in the Meijin league four times and the Honinbo league twice. He is certainly one of the stronger 9-dans and is capable of beating any of the world's best. In his quest for the Tengen title, he overcame some of the legends of Japanese go: Cho Chikun, Otake Hideo, Takemiya Masaki, and Kato Masao. His record this year is 33 wins to 14 losses, a superb 70.2 winning percentage.

The title match was a one-sided affair, with Kudo taking the series 3-1. His only loss came in the third game which he forfeited after

The 23rd Meijin League. Title holder: Cho Chikun

Rank		KK	OR	KS	RS	TM	KM	YN	RK	TH	Won	Lost
1	Kobayashi Koichi						○				1	0
2	O Rissei									○	1	0
3	Kataoka Satoshi							●			0	1
4	Ryu Shikun										0	0
5	Takemiya Masaki								●		0	1
6	Kato Masao	●									0	1
7	Yoda Norimoto			○							1	0
7	Rin Kaiho					○					1	0
7	Tono Hiroaki		●								0	1

capturing a ko without making a ko threat. According to Kudo, he realized he was hopelessly behind and wasn't thinking about his next move, only the best way to resign. He was already in byo-yomi.

The results of the match:

Game 1: 97/11/6. Kudo won by 4 1/2 points.

Game 2: 11/13. Kudo won by 3 1/2 points.

Game 3: 12/4. Kudo lost by illegal ko capture.

Game 4: 12/15. Ryu resigned.

The 23rd Kisei Playoff

Yoda to Challenge Cho

On November 17 and 24, Yoda Norimoto defeated Ryu Shikun 2-0 in the playoff to decide the challenger to Cho Chikun for the Kisei title. This will be Yoda's first challenge for a best-of-seven title.

Yoda has had a number of important successes over the past three years. In Japanese tournaments he presently holds the Gosei title. He also held the Judan title for two terms. In the international arena, he won the Samsung Cup in 1996 and was the runner-up in the 3rd Ing Cup.

The results of the playoff between Ryu and Yoda are as follows:

Game 1: 97/11/17. Ryu resigned.

Game 2: 11/24. Yoda won by 5 1/2 points.

The first game of the best-of-seven title match will be played on January 14 and 15 in Hong Kong.

News from Korea

Lee Chang-ho continues to dominate the domestic Korean scene. His presence in title matches is ubiquitous and he seems nearly unstoppable. His only real opponent seems to be Cho Hoon-hyun, who has made a comeback from his slump of two years ago.

Yoo Chang-hyuk, on the other hand, just like his compatriot in Japan Ryu Shikun, is having his 'annus horribilis'. Since losing three straight games to Lee in the LG Cup last May (see GW80, page 40), he hasn't managed to get into a single title match and his winning percentage has been hovering around 50%, a miserable showing for a player of his caliber.

The newest star on the horizon is Choi Myung-hoon. He has yet to take a major title,

he is one of the few players to be challenging the present hegemony of Lee and Cho.

Here is a review of the Korean tournament scene since June.

The 31st Wangwi Title Match

The Wangwi title match, with its 35,000,000 won first prize, is the third most lucrative title, but, because of its long tradition and the fact that its title match is a best-of-seven, it is perhaps the most prestigious. This year Cho Hoon-hyun challenged Lee Chang-ho for the title, but, in spite of having a commanding lead in games two and three, he made some slack moves which allowed Lee to eke out half-point wins in the endgame. A detailed commentary on games two to four will be found starting on page 21 of this issue. Game One of this title match was presented in GW80, page 29.

The 2nd Tekron Cup

For the third time in less than a year, the 22-year-old Choi Myung-hoon has challenged Lee Chang-ho for a major title. In 1997 he was the challenger for the Myung-in (Meijin) title and earlier this year for the Kisung (Kisei) title. However, he lost this best-of-five match by a lopsided score of 3-0. Game Three from this match are presented on page 38.

The 28th Myung-in Title Match: Cho Avenges His Honor

Choi Myung-hoon had a good chance of getting into another Myung-in title match with Lee, but he lost his bid when he was defeated by Cho Hoon-hyun in the best-of-three playoff to decide the challenger. Having lost so ignominiously to Lee in the Wangwi title, Cho was probably determined to get another shot at Lee. Although he lost the first two games of this best-of-five match, he rallied to win the next three games and the title. Commentaries on games three and five begin on page 40.

The 2nd Chunwon (Tengen) Title Match Lee Chang-ho vs. Cho Hoon-hyun

After Cho Hoon-hyun won the Myung-in title with his three-game fight-back, it appeared that he had found the key to beating Lee, but as the best-of-five Chunwon title match showed, Lee was just suffering from a

short-lived slump. When Lee faced Cho in this title match, he again swept the series 3-0.

41st Guksu: Seo Bong-soo Challenges Lee

It has been three years since Seo Bong-soo has challenged for a title. Before the advent of Lee and Yoo Chang-hyuk, he was Cho Hoon-hyun's main rival in the Korean tournament scene. The last title he held was the Gukgi (National Go Championship) in 1992; he lost it to Lee in 1993.

In the final preliminary to decide the challenger to this year's Guksu title holder, Seo again faced his old nemesis Cho in a best-of-three playoff. Seo won that match 2-0, so he got the right to challenge Lee, who has held this oldest of Korean titles for four consecutive terms.

Lee won the first two games, but Seo came back to win the third. The remaining games are scheduled to be played in December.

Top Ten Korean Players

(As of November 10, 1997)

Player	Won-Lost
1. Lee Chang-ho 9-dan	62-15 (80.5%)
2. Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan	55-27 (67.1%)
3. Choi Myung-hoon 6-dan	52-27 (65.8%)
4. Seo Bong-soo 9-dan	37-20 (64.9%)
5. Choi Gyu-byung 8-dan	35-1-21 (62.3%)
6. Kim Dong-yup 7-dan	29-18 (61.7%)
7. Jang Hyun-san 6-dan	28-17 (62.2%)
8. Kim Seon-kun 8-dan	28-19 (59.6%)
9. Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan	28-23 (54.9%)
10. Seong Dae-sang 7-dan	27-22 (55.1%)

News from China

10th Mingren Title Match: Ma Xiaochun Defends His Title Against Luo Xihi

Luo Xihi 6-dan won this year's six-man Chinese Mingren (Meijin) league with five straight wins, earning the right to challenge Ma Xiaochun for the title. This is the second time he has faced Ma in this title match: his first challenge came three years ago at the age of 17. He lost that match 3-2.

He got off to a good start this year, winning the first game on November 10 when Ma resigned after 146 moves. However, Ma came back to win the next three games, played on November 13, 15, and 17, and the match.

You will find two of Luo's games from the league starting on page 43.

3rd NEC Cup

The winner of the 3rd Chinese NEC Cup is decided by an eight-player league. This year Shao Weigang bested the other players with a score of six wins to one loss, which came at the hands of Yu Bin. In second place was Ma Xiaochun with a score of 5-2. Ma lost to both Shao and Chang Hao.

Chinese Ratings

(November 1997)

Player	Points
1. Chang Hao 8-dan	2,711
2. Ma Xiaochun 9-dan	2,674
3. Yu Bin 9-dan	2,665
4. Zhou Heyang 6-dan	2,645
5. Zhang Wendong 9-dan	2,637
6. Shao Weigang 8-dan	2,619
7. Wang Lei 6-dan	2,614
8. Luo Xihi 6-dan	2,600
9. Nie Weiping 9-dan	2,579
10. Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan	2,578

The Second Woman 9-dan

There are now two women 9-dans, with Rui Naiwei being joined by another Chinese player, Feng Yun. Her promotion took place on March 26, 1997 after she beat Chang Hao.

Top Ten Japanese Players

(As of December 31, 1997)

Having presented the top-performing pros in Korea and China, we believe that our readers will be interested in Japan's top ten. List includes only players 7-dan and above. Cho Chikun ended the year 26-13 (66.7%).

Player	Won-Lost
1. Yamada Kimiyo Oza	47-19 (71.2%)
2. Mimura Tomoyasu 7-dan	45-15 (75%)
3. O Rissei 9-dan	45-19 (70.3%)
4. Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan	44-15 (74.6%)
5. Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan	44-20 (68.7%)
6. Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan	42-11 (79.2%)
7. O Meien 9-dan	39-15 (72.2%)
8. Ueki Yoshio 7-dan	38-19 (66.7%)
9. Kato Masao Judan	37-23 (61.6%)
10. Yoda Norimoto	36-18 (66.7%)

The 10th Fujitsu Cup

Kobayashi Koichi finally wins a world championship



Kobayashi Koichi (right) triumphs in the final. O Rissei has to be content with his second 2nd place.

One of the anomalies of international go, at least from the Japanese point of view, was the failure of Kobayashi Koichi to win one of the world championships while he was the monarch of the Japanese go world with both the Kisei and Meijin titles (he held the Kisei title from 1986 to 1993 and the Meijin title from 1988 to 1994). Actually, during this period Kobayashi consistently appeared only in the Fujitsu Cup; he never bothered with the Tong Yang Securities Cup and he declined to play in the 2nd Ing Cup (and was not invited to the 3rd). The reason seems to be that he preferred to concentrate on the top Japanese titles, which were more lucrative (putting aside the Ing Cup, some of whose tournament conditions he disagreed with).

After he lost all his Japanese titles, however, Kobayashi decided to make a bigger effort in the international titles. He started

by playing in the 1st Samsung Cup and 8th Tong Yang preliminary tournaments at his own expense (see GW78, page 19; for a discussion of his results in international play, see GW74, page 59).

The other big change in Kobayashi's life has been the death of his wife Reiko 6-dan in March 1996 (her yearlong fight with cancer may have been a factor in his poor results in the second half of 1995). While she was alive, he often testified to the importance to his career of her support and encouragement; after her death, he wrote a series of articles for *Kido* about their life together and has just published a book of her letters to him (Reiko had an old-fashioned devotion to her correspondence).

Kobayashi's first world title came nearly a year and a half after Reiko's death. As we can see from the *Kido* report that follows, she is still very much in his thoughts.

Before going on to the commentary, let's review the path to the final of the two players. Kobayashi defeated Seo Bong-soo of Korea and Chang Hao and Zhou Heyang of China. That's a very meritorious performance: Seo is one of the world's top players and Chang and Zhou are the number one and four players in the Chinese rating system (not to mention the fact that Chang destroyed the Japanese team in the 10th and 11th Japan-China Super Go series). In past Fujitsu Cups, Kobayashi has come 2nd once, 3rd twice and 4th twice.

O Rissei's record was no less praiseworthy. He defeated Yang Jaeho of Korea, Liu Xiaoguang of China, Cho Chikun and, in the semifinal, Ma Xiaochun of China, the previous year's champion. O has usually done quite well in the Fujitsu Cup and has come 2nd and 3rd once each.

Kobayashi's first world title First step towards a comeback

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan (Japan)

Black: O Rissei 9-dan (Japan)

Komi: 5½; time: 3 hours each.

Played in Tokyo on August 2, 1997.

Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki, based on a public commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.

A 'world's number one' offered at his wife's grave

'With this, I can finally make a good report to Reiko.' Kobayashi spoke these words with deep feeling after the conclusion of the game.

It could only be called an irony of fate. Kobayashi had lorded it over the go world for so long, yet when his life's companion Reiko 7-dan¹ left on her last journey, he was titleless. 'At the end, I showed her my feckless side,' said Kobayashi, and he vowed to her to make a comeback.

However, the enormous gap that had opened up in his life could not be filled in just a day or two.

'While Reiko was alive, I lost all my titles. Then came her death. I wondered if I would

be able to go on. But, for her sake and for mine, I couldn't let myself end up like this.'

Kobayashi has long been waiting for this day when he could make an offering of a big title at her grave. Most of the fans assembled to watch the public commentary on the final were only too well aware of his feelings. When he appeared on the stage after the game, he was enveloped in thunderous applause. I've never heard such warm applause before.

After the first anniversary of Reiko's death, Kobayashi had his first big title for a long time — his first world championship.

'When I had the Kisei and Meijin titles, I wanted to win this title, but I just couldn't. It's strange that I've been able to win it now when I have no titles.'

For the 1st to 5th terms, the Fujitsu Cup was monopolized by Japan (including Cho Chikun, playing for Japan, in the 4th Cup). However, in the 6th to 9th Cups, victory went to Korean and Chinese players. This year, for the first time since the 5th Cup, both players in the final were Nihon Ki-in players.




Figure 1 (1-41)


Figure 1 (1-41). *White's dubious move*

The fuseki starts quietly. Black 23 represents some resistance to White's strategy — if 23 at 25, White A would make ideal shape.

White 28-Black 29: the question of who

¹She was promoted posthumously.

will gain from this exchange is the focus of the opening. That's why Black answers White's invasion of 30–36 with 37 and 39. Instead of 37, Black 1 in *Dia. 1* is also a joseki, but the result to 8, with White moving out to the left, is not what Black wants.



Dia. 1: good for White

White 40. This capture is strange or perhaps one should say inexplicable. Black 41, linking up 11 and 27, is thick. Forestalling this with White 40 at B would be the commonsense move. Black could then capture two stones with C, but that would be gote and wouldn't hurt White so much. Black seizes the initiative with 41.




Figure 2 (42–66)


Figure 2 (42–66). *Black takes the lead.*

Once Black has blocked White's path out to the centre with 41 (the marked stone), the sequence of Black A–White B–Black C, splitting White into two, becomes severe. How-

ever, adding a move simply to secure his connection would be too painful for White, so he tries to force his way through the gap with 46 and 48.

However, you can't say that White has done well up to 59. Not only Ishida Yoshio but also the other pros in the pressroom favoured Black at this point. The black position at the bottom has suddenly swelled up and White is far from having an edge in the balance of thickness/thinness on the right.

Instead of White 50, correct shape is 1 in *Dia. 2*. If Black played 2 at 4, White 2 would be good. But Black will extend at 2, putting White on the spot. White 50 is a desperation measure.



Dia. 2: good for Black

The moves from White 60 on are a leaning attack. White is aiming at the two black stones. However, Kobayashi was underestimating the effectiveness of a countermeasure available to Black.

The Fujitsu Cup: The World Go Championship

1 (1988). 1st: Takemiya Masaki (Japan); 2nd: Rin Kaiho (Japan); 3rd: Nie Weiping (China); 4th: Kobayashi Koichi (Japan).

2 (1989). 1st: Takemiya; 2nd: Rin; 3rd: Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea); 4th: Seo Bong-soo (Korea).

3 (1990). 1st: Rin; 2nd: Nie Weiping; 3rd: Kobayashi Koichi; 4th: Cho Hoon-hyun.

4 (1991). 1st: Cho Chikun (Japan); 2nd: Qian Yuping (China); 3rd: O Rissei (Japan); 4th: Kobayashi Koichi.

5 (1992). 1st: Otake Hideo (Japan); 2nd: O Rissei; 3rd: Ma Xiaochun (China); 4th: Liu Xiaoguang (China).

6 (1993). 1st: Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea); 2nd: Cho Hoon-hyun; 3rd: Kato Masao (Japan); 4th: Awaji Shuzo (Japan).
 7 (1994). 1st: Cho Hoon-hyun; 2nd: Yoo; 3rd: Rin Kaiho; 4th: Cho Chikun.
 8 (1995). 1st: Ma Xiaochun; 2nd: Kobayashi Koichi; 3rd: Yoo; 4th: Cho Chikun.
 9 (1996). 1st: Lee Chang-ho (Korea); 2nd: Ma; 3rd: Kobayashi Koichi; 4th: Liu.
 10th (1997). 1st: Kobayashi Koichi; 2nd: O Rissei; 3rd: Ma; 4th: Zhou Heyang (China).





Figure 3 (67-90)



Dia. 3: the other way to lose


Figure 3 (67-90). A bitterly regretted peep

'The contact play on the right side was severe,' said Kobayashi after the game. You

can tell from this comment that he had not taken the prospect of 71 seriously. His hand stopped on seeing 71 and he plunged into deep thought for 30 minutes. With a time allowance of three hours, that's a very slow move.

Answering at 72 is unavoidable. If possible, White would like to hane at 1 in *Dia. 3*, but Black 2 and 4 put him on the spot. If White uses 5 to connect at 6, Black splits him into two with 'a'—White 5—Black 'b'. But when White plays 5, Black cuts at 6 and is satisfied. Kobayashi weighed these two choices in the balance and opted for the one in the game. Actually, it was just a choice between two different ways of losing.

O then played a bitterly regretted peep at 83 — the timing couldn't have been worse. O meant to be cautious, but this move invited the severe attack of 84 on. One move let White stage an upset.



Dia. 4: Black keeps his lead

Instead of trying to play this forcing move, Black just had to make the diagonal connection of 1 in *Dia. 4*. O was worried about 2 and 4 (which is why he played 83), but Black can connect at 5. If White 6, Black counters with 7 and 9 and there's no problem: Black gets a loose ladder. When Black plays 1, the best White can do is to hane at 'a', but Black extends at 'b' and keeps the lead.

However, you have to give Kobayashi credit for seizing upon this momentary lapse by O. He has regained his old sharpness.





Figure 4 (91-110)
95: ko (above 92); 98: ko (at 92);
100: connects (above 92)




Dia. 5: White wins

Figure 4 (91-110). White takes the lead.

Judging by the result, you can say that the game started to turn bad for Black the instant he peeped at 83 in Figure 3. However, there are many exciting scenes before the game is concluded.


Just to give an example — if Black could use 91 to connect at 1 in Dia. 5, the game would be over on the spot. However, White has a clever answer with 2 and 4, and now Black is the one who collapses. The deciding move is the throw-in at 8, which wins the capturing race; after 10, White has five lib-

erties to Black's four. That is why Black has no choice but to hane at 91 and fight the ko.



Dia. 6

5: connects (below 3)




Dia. 7

The ko threat of 93 loses points, so what if Black were to play at 1 in Dia. 6 first? White will answer at 2 and seek ko threats at the top. White makes a trade with 4 and 6. The question now is: what happens to the white group on the right side? The answer: it lives neatly as in Dia. 7. The exchange of Black 1 for White 2 in Dia. 6 has become a bad one for Black — without it, the white group wouldn't be able to live. That explains why Black has no choice but to play the point-losing ko threat of 93.

White 96 is an effective ko threat — and an ironic one. If Black ends the ko with 1 in Dia. 8 (next page), White 2 enables White to capture the marked two stones in sente. After 7, White switches to 8 or 'a' and has a reasonable game. The reason why we called 96 an ironic move is that it also steals Black's eye shape. Even though Black captures two stones with 99 and 101, he is not yet alive. Because of that, White's cut at 104 becomes sente.





Dia. 8: White is satisfied





Figure 5 (111-135)



Dia. 9
5: retakes

Dia. 10

Figure 5 (111-135). Sure of victory

From this point, Kobayashi just tries to wrap up his win as quickly as possible.

White plays with precision with 14 on in response to Black 11 and 13. Note that 22 is an important move; if White tenukies, he'll run into bad trouble after Black 1 in *Dia. 9*. He gets only a false eye in the centre, so he has to add a stone at 6, but that leaves Black with a cut at 'a'. Actually, that's why Black linked up with 19 in the figure and not 1 in *Dia. 10*; Black's move here would let White play 2, which threatens a ko after White 'a' through 'e'.

After he answered Black's invasion at 23 with 24 to 30, Kobayashi was probably confident of victory. White 28 emphasizes the threat of the cut beginning with White A. White could use 32 to go through with this cut. However, Kobayashi judged that making Black invest a move at 33, letting him block at 34, was enough to win.

Black 35 reinforces Black's thin centre position; without this stone, White B will be severe.




Figure 6 (136-200)

Archrivals in 1997

O Rissei and Kobayashi kept running into each other throughout the year — you could almost say they were the main rivals of the year. If you put aside actual title matches, probably no other two players were paired in so many key games.

O got off to a good start in the 'series' by winning the NHK Cup in March.

(Continued over page)

O continued by defeating Kobayashi in the 6th round of the Meijin league, thus taking the sole lead, but then his luck changed. He finished the Meijin league in a tie with Kobayashi, but lost the playoff, held on August 11, just over one week after the Fujitsu final.

The following month, Kobayashi defeated O in the final of the 30th Haya-go Championship and O defeated him in the quarter-finals of the Kakusei tournament.

Figures 6 & 7

Kobayashi succeeded in winning the Fujitsu Cup in his second appearance in the final. For the second time, O Rissei saw victory elude his grasp after having taken the lead.

White wins by 4½ points.

(Kido, September 1997. Translated by John Power.)




Figure 7 (201–264)

13: connects (at 4); 37: connects (at 32)

The 2nd LG Cup

Hans Pietsch's triumph over Yoda

O Rissei makes semifinals

The LG Cup World King of Baduk Tournament is a new international tournament founded last year by the LG Group in association with the Korean Daily newspaper. It actually represents an expansion of the domestic King of Baduk title, which had lasted 20 terms, into a large-scale international tournament. The first prize was increased by a factor of ten, taking it to 200 million won (which last year was worth \$250,000, but since then the Korean won has plummeted).

The 1st LG Cup was dominated by Korean players, who provided three of the semifinalists. The best Japanese player was Kobayashi Satoru, who lost to Lee Chang-ho in the quarterfinals; Ma of China made it to the semifinals, but there he lost to the same player. In the best-of-five final, Lee defeated Yoo Chang-hyuk with three straight wins (the third game was given in GW80).

This year 24 players played in the main tournament: 11 from Korea, five each from Japan and China, and one each from Chinese Taipei, Europe, and the U.S.A. Once again,

three Koreans reached the semifinals and they were the same three as last year: Lee Chang-ho, Yoo Chang-hyuk, and Choi Myong-hoon 6-dan. They were joined by O Rissei, playing for Japan. This time Ma ran into Lee in the quarterfinals.

As reported in GW80, there were some noteworthy results in the early rounds of the 2nd Cup. Most striking was the win by Hans Pietsch 1-dan, playing for Europe, against Yoda Norimoto, holder of the Gosei title. The hosts were probably grateful to Hans for this effort, as Yoda has perhaps the best results against Koreans of any Japanese player. In the second round, Hans ran into his teacher, Kobayashi Satoru, who did not let his guard down against his disciple.

We would like to present three games from this tournament: Hans's win over Yoda, and O Rissei's games against Rui Naiwei, the world's top woman player, who represented the U.S.A., and Cho Hoon-hyun of Korea, who defeated Cho Chikun in the second round.

Round One: Hans Pietsch vs. Yoda Norimoto

White: Yoda Norimoto Gosei (Japan)

Black: Hans Pietsch 1-dan (Europe)

Played in Seoul on May 27, 1997.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan. Report by Matsuura Takamoto.

Get stronger

I think seven years have passed since Hans came to Japan. I must have played him 20 to 30 games, from two-stone handicaps to even. His go, in one word, is thick. But this 'thickness' can sometimes turn into slackness. Recently he seems to be taking more interest in territory, but he still hasn't reached the level where he can create his own style.

The game we are presenting here was played between Hans and Yoda Gosei in the first round of the 2nd LG Cup. Yoda tried to make Hans exert all his strength. Hans rose to the challenge and, although there were some places along the way where he was a bit shaky, won the game by half a point. A shodan beating the Gosei is quite an impressive feat. But if I may be permitted a few severe words as his teacher, Hans didn't succeed in making Yoda take him seriously. Whether or not this win has any meaning will depend on how Hans approaches go from now on.

Everyone knows that this win was a fluke. The only way for your wins not to be labeled flukes is to get stronger. The only way to get stronger is to study. Just four months after becoming professional, Hans has had a great stroke of luck; I hope it will be an incentive to become stronger.

Figure 1 (1-26). A teaching game

White 12, 16. Somehow these moves gave me the impression that Yoda is treating this as a teaching game. Between top pros, the game would be unloseable for Black after 17.

Black 25. Black 1 in *Dia. 1* is the only move. The tip of White's sword (the marked stone) is already poking out into the centre right, so Black can't get a very big territory on the right. He must defend solidly with 1.

White's invasion at 26 is natural. Hans is now faced with his first real test.





Figure 1 (1-26)



Dia. 1: the only move

Figure 2 (27-74). Missing a chance to decide the game

How should Black respond to White's jump to 30? This is a very difficult position, and I'm not sure myself. Hans's 31 gets a passing mark: it combines excellently with 27 and 29. This move 'builds a core'; both physically and mentally, you are in a very serene state when you can play moves like this.

However, Black 33 is a bad move. Black's plan is probably to link Black A with his attack on the right. I understand his feelings, but White will connect at 34 whenever Black

peeps. Depending on the overall position, Black can aim at invading at B. You can say that there's not one plus from making the peep.





Figure 2 (27-74)

63: ko (at 29); 66: ko (at 58)



Dia. 2: the only move

Well, up until this point Yoda has not been making the game tough for Black, but even so White 44 is too nonchalant. White's only choice is to strengthen his position with White C, Black D, White E, Black F, White 56. When White is forced to resort to a ko for life after Black seals him in with 45, the game is over. However, Black 59 in response to White 58 is close to being the losing move. If you're a professional, you should see Black 1 in *Dia. 2* at a glance. If White answers at 'a', you get loads of ko threats here. In the game, in contrast, White takes sente with 60 and cuts at 62; he then uses up his sole ko threat with 64, but Black has none. In a flash, Black's lead has been upset.

Figure 3 (75-110). *Losing one's cool*

I got the feeling from Black 75 that Hans

had lost his cool. Of course, this was the correct reaction: he must inwardly have been ashamed of his play on the right side.





Figure 3 (75-110)



Dia. 3: don't help the opponent

This is a fine point, but now is the correct timing for Black 85. At this point, White has no choice but to atari at 86, so next Black can clamp at 87. I'm glad to see that Hans has acquired this professional technique.

There are problems for Hans in the exchange from 92.

The peep of 99 gives his opponent a lot of help. In positions like this, you should simply reinforce with 1 in *Dia. 3*. If White 2, Black should secure definite life at the top with 'a' and aim at a counterattack. Black has sente moves like 'b' and 'c', so if he wedges in at 'd', White won't be able to resist. Black can easily cut.

Around here, Hans's youth is proving a minus; perhaps he was still affected by his failure on the right side. Yoda, on the other hand, doesn't seem to have successfully switched from the 'teaching mode' in which he started the game.







Figure 4 (111-141)




Dia. 4
2: tenuki



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 4 (111-141). Favoured by luck

Let's assess the position after White 34.

The remaining large points are at the bottom and on the right side. Black has no chance of giving the komi unless he plays first in both places. In particular, White A would give Black a severe jolt. If Black ignores it, White B and Black C can be expected; if Black blocks at D instead of C, White C will endanger the eye shape of the whole group. Also, if Black answers White A with E, White will thrust up at F, leaving him with a big move at D.

After much agonizing, Hans chose to play Black 35. I was impressed that he found this move. He gets another passing grade. Usually, you'd expect Black 1 in *Dia. 4*. However, White will ignore it and switch to A in the figure. Black seems to get a successful attack with 3 to 7, but White has a good answer at 8. Next —

Dia. 5. Black loses the capturing race after 1.

If White ignores Black 35, Black gets at least a ko with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 6*. When I spoke with Hans after the game, he said that he hadn't read out this variation. After White 2, he planned to play Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c' as in *Dia. 4* — he couldn't have seen White's refutation at 'd', as in *Dia. 4*.

What this means is that if White had just ignored Black 35 and had switched to A, Black wouldn't have been able to win this game. Hans was lucky — but this kind of luck is very necessary for professionals. There's no need to criticize Hans for not being able to read as far as *Dia. 6*; even for a professional, it is easy to hallucinate that *Dia. 4* works.

One other point: Black 37 is a bit of a loss. But it makes the extension of 39 absolute sente. If White omits 40, the attack in *Dias. 4* and 5 now works, as the 35-36 exchange has filled in a white liberty.

Instead of 36, White should have played the calm move of 1 in *Dia. 7*.

So Black gets to play the eagerly awaited move of 41. There may have been a gap in his reading, but Hans succeeded in playing both 35 and 41 against Yoda, so he deserves our praise.

Black wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

(Kido, August 1997)




Figure 5 (142–200)




Figure 6 (201–280)

ko: 24, 27, 30, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, 58;
60: connects (at 25); 61: ko; 67: connects (left of 21);
80: connects (above 64)



Yoda Gosei



Hans Pietsch

Born on September 27, 1968 in Germany. Disciple of Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan, then her brother Satoru 9-dan. Began studying as an insei at the Nihon Ki-in in October 1990, promoted to 1-dan in 1997.

Round Two O Rissei vs. Rui Naiwei

White: O Rissei 9-dan (Japan)

Black: Rui Naiwei 9-dan (U.S.A.)

Played in Seoul on June 29, 1997.

Commentary by Ryu Shikun Tengen.

In this article, I would like to look at a game in which O Rissei is tormented by the power of Rui Naiwei.

I also participated in the LG Cup, but in the second round I lost to Korea's Yoo Chang-hyuk. At one point during the game, I thought that I was a little ahead, but my failure to win a game in which I had a lead shows just how weak I am.

Let's look at the O-Rui game. As I'm sure the reader knows, Rui left the Chinese Weiqi Association some years ago and is now a member of the American Professional Go Association. That means she doesn't get many chances to compete at the top level, but that seems to have made no difference to

her strength. As we can see from her game against O Rissei, she's no ordinary player.





Figure 1 (1-39)



Dia. 1: a favourite O pattern

Figure 1 (1-39). Daring to give the opponent ideal shape

Countering White 10 with the Black 11-13 combination is a favourite pattern of Rui's, I hear.


The sequence to 23 is a joseki. However, O often plays the sequence shown in *Dia. 1*. If Black 4, White settles his group by cutting at 5; the marked black stone is high, so Black will probably add another stone at 10. I think that this diagram is also a good strategy.

Well, now we come to a difficult point: White 24. White wants to play somewhere that will make Black cut at A, but he can't find a way to do this. If he splits the right side into two with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will probably answer by extending up the side at 2. If White now connects at 3, Black plays 4 and 6, and White's stones are heavy. What

White wants is for Black to use 2 to cut at 3, after which he would switch to White 'a'. I wondered about playing White 1 at 'b', but this is not particularly attractive after Black 'c', White 'd', Black 4, White 5, Black 'e'.

Black 27 shows good judgement on Rui's part. The continuation to 39 is a joseki, but not only does Black have no cause for dissatisfaction locally, she has also managed to set up a moyo while dispensing with the cut at A, so you can say that she has made ideal shape.

Note that sliding at 32 instead of 30 would only make Black 27 more effective.



Dia. 2: not an improvement for White

Figure 2 (40-77). A unique world of his own

O has a unique approach: he tries to fight it out with the opponent after first letting him or her make ideal shape. This is something we can't imitate.

Common sense tells you that entering at 40 after Black has set up her moyo lets White in for a hard time: Black solidly blocks the way out with 41.

Black comes to a fork in the road when White turns at 46. I don't know if it's good or bad, but I would feel tempted to seal White in with Black 47 at A, White B, Black 52. I think this would also be more typical of Rui's style.

The pressure on White is eased when he plays 52. However, the game looks more promising for Black.

White 56 is a move from the unique world of O Rissei. It's a strange move: I don't

understand its meaning — what does White plan to do next? Let's just say that it's impossible to explain. The usual move would be to jump to C.





Figure 2 (40-77)



Dia. 3: simplifying the game

Rui's aggressive response with 57 etc. seems to indicate that she has been provoked by O's strange style. Her play is certainly severe, but it's doubtful that she profits in the overall context. How about playing Black 1 in *Dia. 3*? The best White can do is to answer at 2, so Black then blocks White's way out on the right with 3, making White link up on *dame* points up to 8. Now it's not too late to play Black 9; Black has a good game territorially, and, above all, the game

has been simplified.

The continuation in the game is pretty well a one-way street. If White plays 66 at 74, Black makes a severe cut with Black 66, White 67, Black D, White connects, Black E — White would have almost no chance of saving 56 and 58.

Black captures the corner by brute force, but it's not so big. The way I see it, Black has given White a chance. However, Rui's play after this is incredible.




Figure 3 (78-123)

Figure 3 (78-123). Tremendous power

Rui may not have many opportunities for tournament play, but it hasn't affected her strength. She possesses awesome power.

To start with, the cut of Black 89 is tremendous. I couldn't play such a frightening move — I'd probably just cut at 97.

The all-out move of Black 95 is also astonishing. O starts playing funnily — perhaps he's been overwhelmed by Rui's forcefulness. Look at White 96: what's got into him? Pushing at 1 in *Dia. 4* (next page) is the only move. About the only thing Black can do is to cut at 2, so White counters with 3 to 7. Black has to add a move at 8, so White captures the top on a large scale with 9. This should give him quite a reasonable game.

Then there's White 100: you'd think he'd atari at 101. With this exchange (White 101, Black captures) on the board, I don't believe that White would have much trouble


rescuing his group.

Black needs no second invitation to force with 101 and 103, so White's shape crumbles.

When White casts a thin enclosing net with 108 and 110, Black has no trouble breaking through it with 111 and 113. When Black moves out with 115, we have a classic splitting attack. Trouble is not the word for it: White is on the verge of collapse.

Black 119. Black could also continue to harass the centre group with an atari at 120, followed by White A, Black 121, White 122, and Black B. However, even though Black permits White to link up with 120, capturing the other group with 123 gives her a definite lead. If you assume that the black group at the top has no worries, then you could say that the game is over.

Rui's power is frightening. O Rissei did play some dubious moves, but even so there are very few players in the world who could overwhelm him like this.



Dia. 4: the only move

Figure 4 (124–149). The game should be over, but ...

White blocks at 24, aiming to harass the large black group. Black 25 is uncalled-for. If Black simply pushed through at 26, I believe that White's resignation would have followed soon after.

Once Black has played at 25, then 29 is clearly strange. If Black linked up with A, White's resignation would be imminent.

Instead of White 28, if White plays B,

Black C, White D, then locally Black doesn't have two eyes, but Black can resist by attaching at A, so it's not so simple to kill this group.






Figure 4 (124–149)



Dia. 5: a one-sided ko




Dia. 6: a safe win

The result when White plays 28 and 30 is a trade of sorts. At the time, I assumed that O had calculated everything, but that's not really the case. Conservatively speaking, White is definitely at least ten points behind on the board.

However, Rui was probably short of time. From here on, her play becomes very erratic. Black 41 is awful. This is the sort of

invasion only a player like Rui, who reads well, could make. It's quite feasible, but the timing couldn't be worse. Why didn't she first force with Black 43 to 47? If White tenukies then, Black gets a 'flower-viewing' ko with 1 to 9 in *Dia. 5*. If White connects at 4 instead of 2, he dies unconditionally after Black 2, White 8, Black 6. If White cuts at 'a', Black safely counters with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

That means that White has to add a move at 1 in *Dia. 6*, after which Black has a big move at 2. Next, 'a' and 'b' are miai, so Black's ten-point lead on the board is intact.



Dia. 7: still a safe win

In the game, White is able to counter with 48. Black 41 becomes *mochikomi* (a loss without compensation), which means that Black loses five points. That changes the complexion of the game, but Black can still win.

There are times when the blood rushes to your head and you can't see a thing. Black 49 is a good example. For a player of Rui's stature to make such a simple slip! There's nothing difficult about it — Black should simply throw in at 1 in *Dia. 7* before defending at 3. This sets up the descent of 'a', which will capture five stones.

Black 49 is probably the psychological losing move.

Figure 5 (150–200). Rui's regrets

When White connects at 56 and plays 60, Black seems to be just a little behind.

The move that irrevocably loses the game is Black 61. The bottom right corner seems to be set up to invite mistake after mistake by Black. If Black made a hane at 1 in *Dia. 8*, forcing White to add a stone at 2, Black would gain two points compared to the game. I examined the endgame after this and found the game to be a half-pointer, though I couldn't decide in whose favour.





Figure 5 (150–200)

ko: 85, 88, 91, 94, 97, 100



Dia. 8: a two-point gain for Black

If Black wants to play the best possible moves, then she should counter the cut of White 72 by jumping to A. Also, Black 75 and 77 are OK, but after that she should simply block at B and force White to add a stone inside instead of starting a ko fight with 79. The game would still be tough for her, but there would be a chance — just a chance — that the half point would be in her favour.

Unable to make a precise positional evaluation, Rui seems to have chosen the path to self-destruction.

Rui may have lost this game, but she displayed her strength to the full. However, this kind of loss is a major shock — after all, she had many chances to win.

I've examined a number of Rui's games, but I haven't yet had a chance to play her. If possible, I'd like to forgo the honour. Her power would probably demolish me.




Figure 6 (201-264)

6: ko (right of 3); ko (over 14 & 17): 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47; 49: ko (above 72); 52: ko (at 72); 53: connects (at 14)

Black resigns after White 264.
(Igo Club, September 1997)

Quarterfinal O Rissei vs. Cho Hoon-hyun

White: O Rissei 9-dan (Japan)
Black: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan (Korea)
Played in Shanghai on October 19, 1997.
Commentary by O Rissei.




Figure 1 (1-29)

Figure 1 (1-29). A duffer at the fuseki

1997 was not a very satisfying year for me — I kept losing finals and challenger playoffs. [Besides the losses to Kobayashi Koichi detailed on pages 12 and 13, O also lost the Oza playoff and the final of the TV Asia Cup.] While not the only reason, this did spur me on to do my best in international tournaments to compensate.

I ran into Cho Hoon-hyun in the quarter-finals of the 2nd LG Cup. This was our fourth game and my record so far was one win to two losses. By coincidence, I'd had White in every game.

My choice of joseki in the top right was dubious. If the stones to 16 were already in place before Black played 5, White would want to answer by pinching at A. In the game, the two stones at 5 and 7 are working efficiently, but you can't say the same for White 10-16. Instead of 10, I should have invaded immediately at 16.

The territory-oriented moves of 19 and 21 are typical of Cho.

White 22 shows what a duffer I am. Since Black 19 and 21 are low, White mustn't play an approach move here. Instead, White should reduce with White B through White F.

Black 23 and 25 work perfectly.




Figure 2 (30-64). The corner is bigger.

Black 31 and 33 were solid. Cho must have thought that this was enough.

There was room for more thought on my 32. I should have attached at 1, then invaded at 3 in Dia. 1. If Black 4, White plays 5, then switches back to 7 — this takes some territory. If Black blocks at 'a' instead of 4, White plays 7; that secures eye shape plus territory, so it's big.

Black 33. Playing more greedily with

Black A through E would also be a good strategy.

Enclosing the left side with 34 is essential. If White permits Black F, he can no longer compete territorially.




Figure 2 (30-64)

White 36-40 is the standard response to Black 35.

Black 41 and 43 show just how much Cho likes territory. He shrewdly forces from on top and from underneath. He probably disliked the prospect of White G.

White can't afford to answer, so he counters by invading at 44. The continuation to 52 seems reasonable.


Black 53. Isn't blocking at 55 on the lower right the biggest move? That would simplify the game for Black, in my opinion. It's tempting to crawl at 53, as White has tenukied, but now the 41-42 exchange becomes a bad one for Black: Black has no frightening follow-up here.

When I switched to the long-awaited invasion of 54, I felt not just that I had recovered from my shaky start but that I might even have the more promising game.


White 56 seems to have been a good move. If White slides at 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black blocks him with 2 and 4, so he has to play at 5. After 6, White lives with 7, then hanes at 9, but it's questionable if he has profited, as his centre has become thin.

Living with 56 to 64 is a little superior to

Dia. 2. White's corner territory is not to be sneezed at. Around here, I liked my chances. This profit is worth nearly 30 points; Black 53 doesn't begin to compare with it.



97 he had made another miscalculation: he expected White to connect at E, after which he planned to cut at 101. However, White has the clever counter of 98. White 100 becomes sente, enabling White to make good shape with 102. White has again gained points.



Dia. 3: the only move

Black 103 loses the game: extending at 1 in *Dia. 3* is the only move. Being forced to seek life with 3 and 5 is painful, and I believe that White more or less has the lead with 6, but against an opponent like Cho I wouldn't have been completely confident.

White 104 should decide the game: it makes miai of capturing 93 and capturing the black group at the top. Black has no answer: at this moment I felt great.

Figure 4 (105–160). *Black resists, but . . .*

Extending at 5 is the only move, but when White presses the attack with 6 to 10, Black's group is like a candle in the wind.

Black 11. If at 1 in *Dia. 4*, White's plan is to sacrifice with 2 etc. to set up forcing moves on the outside; he looks certain of capturing the black group above after 12.

The peep of White 12 works perfectly: Black can't make two eyes. However, White should first play the atari at 16.

Black offers incredible resistance with 15 — White 16 is no longer sente. For a moment, I almost panicked.

The swap I had feared followed with 25 to 45, but actually this sets the seal on

victory for White, so Cho's fightback fell just one step short.





Figure 4 (105–160)
42: connects; 44: ko; 47: ko



Dia. 4: Black should die

Cho made one uncharacteristic mistake: the exchange of 27 for 30. Perhaps he was in time trouble, but this lost him the endgame move of Black A, so it cost him nearly ten points. Without this, the game would have been much closer, even though White would still have won.

At the end, White is way ahead on the board.

Black resigns after White 160.

(Igo Club, January 1998. Translated by John Power.)

31st Wangwi Title Match

We continue our presentation of the Wangwi title match with analyses of Games Two to Four. Game One appeared in GW80, page 29.

Game Two

White: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan

Black: Lee Chang-ho Wangwi

Time: 5 hours each; komi: 5 1/2 points.

Played on July 5, 1997.

Comments by Lee Chang-ho as reported by Park Chi-mun.

Game Two was held at the Kwang Yang Steel Plant in Kwang Yang city. The parent company, Po Hang Steel, is well known as the BEST Steel Company. The Kwang Yang plant has made many contributions to social and cultural causes and has repeatedly hosted top title matches over the past several years.




Figure 1 (1-32)

Figure 1 (1-32). Trying something new


Park: 'Why didn't you occupy the empty corner instead of answering White 4?'

Lee: 'I just wanted to try something new. Anyway, Black 5 makes a strong formation.'

Instead of the pincer of Black 11, Black 1 in *Dia. 1* was suggested by some of the professionals in the pressroom. They thought the sequence to White 12 would be just as good for Black, but Lee disagreed.


Lee: 'That would invite a pincer at White

2. The sequence through Black 11 doesn't offer any prospects for Black, especially since he lacks a strong position on the lower right.'



Dia. 1

Park: 'Black 27 is an ordinary splitting move, but you spent over 30 minutes before playing it. What were you thinking about?'



Dia. 2


Lee: 'I was reading out the moves after Black 27. Against White 28, should Black just extend two spaces, as in the game, or should he attach against the white stone at 6? After extending, what if White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*? I wasn't sure if the outcome through White 9 was good or bad for Black.'

To Lee's relief, Cho responded to Black 29 with White 30, so Lee happily reinforced his position on the left by jumping to Black 31.

Park: 'Was White 32 an urgent move?'

Lee: 'If Black A, White will close off the corner with B and Black will extend to C. The result is not very interesting. However, Black

1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 3* would be quite severe on White. If Black were then able to connect at A, the clamp at B would become critical.'



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (33-58)


Figure 2 (33-58). A fierce fight

Lee thought for 56 minutes before invading at Black 33. What was he thinking about?

Park: 'Instead of Black 33, the consensus in the pressroom was to invade at 42.'

Lee: 'That was also the first move I thought about. My first impression was that capturing White's lone stone on the right would give me a good result, but look at *Dia. 4*. White can attach at 2. Black must play 3 to avoid bad aji, but White 4 is sente. White next attaches at 6 but when Black captures the single white stone, his stones are overconcentrated. White 16 is now a wonderful move; an attachment at A, to tear up the right side, is also good.'

Lee went on to explain that he also thought about playing A in the figure to build up central influence, but the scale of this move was too broad for him to be confident of the outcome. He therefore chose Black 33. The sequence up to Black 41 was almost like following a joseki.



Dia. 4

Park: 'What can you say about White 42?'


Lee: 'Being able to expand my position on the right side with Black 43, maintaining an offensive posture, made me feel pretty good.'

Park: 'Did you anticipate the invasion of White 44 and subsequent moves through 48?'

Lee: 'Sure! He's my teacher. I knew he would start something.'

Park: 'Kim In 9-dan suggested a shoulder hit with White 1 in *Dia. 5*.'

Lee: 'That's also a good point. I would probably counterattack by invading on the upper left. Black 6 would be interesting.'



Dia. 5

Park: 'Then White would press at 11. What is your evaluation of this sequence?'


Lee: 'Well... let me see. Doesn't Black have a little more territory? He has more than 40 points plus sente.'

Thus, Cho's invasion from White 44 through 48 was an unavoidable gamble to take back the lead. The consensus in the press-


room was that White was clearly behind.

The placement of Black 53 aims at the sequence in *Dia. 6*, but Cho took sente, playing White 54 and 56, then attaching with 58. In this way, he was able to live.

Lee: 'Black 55 was a lukewarm move. If I had played 1 in *Dia. 7* instead, White would have been in trouble. Since 56 was sente, White lived easily.'



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

'Instead of Black 57, going for the kill with Black 1 in *Dia. 8* would be countered by White 2 and 4. Black loses three stones, so White lives. This shows that Black 55 was off the mark.'

Park: 'Doesn't White have the advantage at this stage?'

Lee: 'Yes, he has a big advantage.'



Dia. 8

Figure 3 (59-89). A hidden dagger

Black played 59 and 61 to create aji in the corner. This aji would come to life later in the game. Black 63 attacked the large white group at the top. However, this group had at least one eye when White played 64 and 66, so it was relatively easy for him to live.

Park: 'Black's attack on the white group at the top failed. What were your plans now?'

Lee: 'My game's nearly hopeless. Black 69 was another mistake. I should have simply connected. White could have finished me off at this point.'





Figure 3 (59-89)

Lee showed how White could have clinched the game in *Dia. 9*. After White makes a bamboo joint with 1, he makes two eyes with 3. If Black tries to take away an eye with A, White plays B and C in sente.



Dia. 9

Lee: 'This result leaves Black's center thin, so I can't expect to get much territory there.'


Cho fell for the temptation to cut off the black stone at 69. It is interesting how Black's bad move caused Cho to go astray. As a result, White gave up two stones, allowing Black to become thick in the center. This thickness transformed Black's despair into hope. In addition, White 82 was a dubious move. Cho,

after having had the game in the bag, made one bad move after another.

Lee is famous for his skill in winning won games. On the other hand, Cho usually gets the advantage early, but he works hard to turn it into a victory. If Lee were to play White from this point on, I'm sure he would win easily.

Lee: 'Instead of 82, White should have attacked with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 10*. The result would be much better.'


In *Dia. 10*, White not only eliminates Black's aji in the corner, he also gets some territory to the left of 1 and 3. Just as in the game, White ends in gote, but the result is five or six points better for him.



Dia. 10

Cho probably thought that White 82 would let him end in sente so he could switch to the bottom and finish up the game. But Black 83 and 85, followed by 87, skillfully deprived White of his expected sente because Black can live by playing at either A or B.

With his sente, Lee played a seemingly peculiar hane at Black 89. This is precisely the kind of move that characterizes Lee's style. Whenever he feels that he is falling behind, he pulls out a well-hidden dagger.



Dia. 11

If White responds to 89 with 1 in *Dia. 11*, Black can squeeze with 2 and 4 in sente. Wherever Black plays next at the bottom, at A, B, or C, he will reinforce the center. Cho can't allow this to happen.

Figure 4 (90-120). *Enduring the pain*

Cho spent nearly 20 minutes moaning and agonizing over Black 89. The players in the pressroom expected White to answer with 1 in *Dia. 12*. It seemed that White could settle the situation on the right in sente, then extend to 9 on the left.






Figure 4 (90-120)



Dia. 12

Park: 'Wouldn't White be better off with the variation in *Dia. 12*?'



Dia. 13


Lee: 'It would definitely be better for White, but Black would extend 2 in *Dia. 13*, then connect at 4. White might try to capture

the corner with 5, but extending to Black 10 stops White getting two eyes. Black starts a capturing race with 14, which he wins by one move.'

That explains why Cho extended to 90. Having to answer Black 91 and 93 with White 92 and 94 is painful. White's shape is also bad, but he has no choice but to endure.

Lee: 'By establishing a base at the bottom, Black came out ahead in this exchange.'

Park: 'Then what is White's best response to Black 89?'



Dia. 14


Lee: 'An ordinary move such as White 1 in Dia. 14 would give the best result. Black will play 14 in sente, then try to build up the center with 16. But White could then expand his lower left corner with the sequence from 17. In the process, he engulfs two black stones in the upper left with 25. Black must escape with 26, but White takes more territory in the lower left with 27 to 31. White will probably win. This is the best way for White.'

Park: 'Some of the players in the press-room suggested that White should have played 98 at 1 in Dia. 15. What is your evaluation of this move?'

Lee: 'Black would block off the center with 2 and 4; White would gain nothing.'

Black rescues a stone on the right with 105, but White ensures two eyes for his group with 112 and 114.

When Black extended with 115, he had gained ten points of territory at the bottom. White, for his part, gained nothing in this skirmish.



Dia. 15

Park: 'This has to be a great success for Black. What is your evaluation of the position at this point?'

Lee: 'White is still ahead. Black really had a bad game in the beginning.'

Figure 5 (121–158). *Catching up, step by step*

Black plays two big endgame move with 21 and 23 in sente. He then gingerly switches to the center and plays the two-step hane of 25 and 27. Black is beginning to accumulate some cash.




Figure 5 (121–158)

Park: 'White hasn't gained any territory for some time now, whereas Black has gained some at the bottom and now in the center.'

Lee: 'Black is quite thick in the center. The outlook for Black is now pretty good.'


Park: 'Which is bigger, White 34 or Black 35?'

Lee: 'Probably White 34. White 36 could have been at 37. If White had played there, I would then have had to give up this direction. I was planning to defend at 53.'

White 36 induced a fantastic move at Black 37.

Park: 'With the sequence to 47, Black has managed to take the center. Has Black gone into the lead yet?'

Lee: 'No, not quite. White is still ahead, but 48 is a big mistake.'



Dia. 16

Let us examine *Dia. 16*. According to Lee's explanation, if White omits 48, Black will connect at 1 and the moves to 7 follow. Black has 14 points of territory. Comparing this diagram to the game, Black has 11 points of territory, three points fewer, whereas White's territory is six points. Thus, White 48 was worth nine points in gote. However, White's small knight's jump to A is 11 points if Black answers at B. If Black does not, it would be even bigger for White.

Park: 'Now, you are surely ahead?'


Lee: 'No, White still seems to be half a point ahead.'

Park: 'Opinions were expressed in the pressroom that White should have played at A in *Dia. 16* instead of 52.'

Lee: 'That's not quite true, as you can see in *Dia. 17*. Against White 1, Black might answer at 2. The game here is too close to call.'

White had no choice but to play 52, after which Black defended at 53. As soon as Black

53 was played, everyone in the pressroom agreed that Black would win. It was close, but the tide had turned.



Dia. 17

However, Lee still calculated that White was ahead. That was why he went into long contemplation, trying to figure out how to resolve the half-point ko at the end. But Cho self-destructed at this critical stage.

Figure 6 (159–200). Grinding out a win

Lee: 'White 62 and 64 were the final losing moves. White should have played 1 in *Dia. 18*. Black would then force with 2, and defend at 4. Next, White must play 5 instead of A because A and B are miai, each having a value of a bit more than four points.'





Figure 6 (159–200)



Dia. 18


Park: 'If White had followed this sequence, what would have been the final score?'

Lee: 'White would win by half a point.'


In spite of repeated mistakes, Cho had chances to win up to the end. At 45 and after 10 long hours of fierce combat, he was exhausted and missed his last chance.

Lee: 'White 75 instead of White 70 was one point better.'

After a steady pursuit, Black managed to catch up and win by half a point. Due to the mistake at White 70, the score could have been one and a half points, but in Figure 7 Black lost a point by not playing at 22 with 21, so the result was still a half-point win for Black.



break into Black's niren-sei pattern. Another way is an approach move at White 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black would probably pincer at 2. The sequence to 14 is one possible outcome. Black gets influence while White gets territory.



Dia. 1

Against White 10, Black 11 is the best response. Making a checking extension at Black 13 instead is not a move most professionals would make. Black 11 aims to build a moyo, using the black stones at the bottom. If White were able to extend to A, Black's influence at the bottom could be compromised.

When White played 12, Black instantly invaded at 13. Lee jumped out with White 14 and sat back to observe the board. Black defended with 15 and White slid to 16. Lee seemed to prefer this exchange to attacking the black stone at 13 with a diagonal move at B, which would allow Black to defend at 16.

White took about 4 minutes for all his moves on the right side, but Black responded instantly to each of them. It was not too long ago that Cho would spend a long time on his opening moves and people wondered whether there was really that much to think about. Perhaps he is now more concerned about his physical endurance than anything else. Facing his student who has become his arch rival, he doesn't want to use up all his energy in just one game.

Figure 2 (17-35). *An unappealing new move*

In answer to White 16, Cho attacked the white stone in the middle of the right side

with Black 17. The joseki move is for Black to defend at 18; White then plays 17. But most professionals don't follow josekis so religiously, because this gives the appearance of being timid.





Figure 2 (17-35)

Lee stabilized his stones at the top right with White 18 in sente, then extended to White 20. The professionals in the pressroom predicted that White's next move would be an attachment at A, but White made a placement at 22 instead. According to Yang Jae-ho 9-dan, the official commentator for this game, this was a new move. Lee must have studied it because a few days before he tried White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. The result was not as good as he had expected. However, this new move didn't seem to impress Yang.




Dia. 2

As soon as Black played 23 Lee occupied the 3-3 point with White 24 as if it was the natural sequence. But he then took almost eight minutes before playing his next move. It seemed as if Lee wasn't impressed by the result of his new move either.

Nevertheless, the sequence from Black 25 through White 32 is practically inevitable. One noteworthy observation was that Cho's steady stream of instant responses momentarily halted at White 30. He spent two minutes thinking before playing 31. Two minutes is not long by any measure, but, coming after his string of instantaneous responses, it seemed very long.

With his sente, Cho secured the right side with Black 35. Before this move, however, he exchanged 33 for White 34, not caring about strengthening White's position at the top. The purpose of this exchange was to prevent the attachment at B, but later this move would adversely affect Black's stones at the top.



Dia. 3

If Black had simply played 1 in Dia. 3, White would probably have looked for an opportunity to make a living group with the sequence to 10, but this would have adversely affected his stones in the upper right corner.

Figure 3 (36-60). *White's corner is shattered.*

Realizing the gravity of the situation, Lee spent 39 minutes thinking about White 36. Yang commented that it was the most plausible move. The reason Lee spent so much time on it was to devise a way to cope with Black's counterattack at 37.

Efficient use of time is vital. It is often the determining factor. Cho spent a considerable amount of time on Black 37, while Lee played White 40 and 42 instantly. Again, an interesting contrast between the slow and cautious Cho versus the quick and reckless Lee.





Figure 3 (36-60)



Dia. 4

Seo Bong-soo, who joined Yang in the commentary, suggested that White could crosscut with 45 instead of playing 42. But for White to build influence in the center with 3 and 5 in Dia. 4 would not be very effective because of Black's thick position on the right.

The extension of Black 43 shows an indomitable spirit: White can't be allowed to play there. Up to Black 47, both sides seem happy with the result.

White had taken the four corners while Black controlled the sides. White now played 48, aiming to gain more territory by threatening the three marked black stones, but Black 49 was a timely probe. After a painful evaluation Lee yielded and played White 50. However, Black 51 was met by a stronger response at White 52. Patiently defending the corner with 53 would have been better and typical of Lee's style. As a result, Black was able to penetrate White's corner with the sequence from 53 to 59, a very bad result for White.

Why did Lee play this way? Could it be that being two games up in the match he felt he could afford to take chances?

Suddenly White played 60, attacking the three marked black stones. Will White be able to capture them?




Figure 4 (61-90)


Figure 4 (61-90). Under an evil spell

Because of his big, unexpected gain in the upper left corner, Black was assured of victory, provided he could live with his three isolated stones in the top right. They should have enough resiliency to survive — not a thing to worry about, or so it seemed. But Cho played as if he was under some evil spell.

Black 61 was a light move. 'A one-space jump towards the center is never bad,' according to the proverb. But it was later labeled as the first losing move.


'Any simple sequence would enable these stones to live,' lamented Cho after the game, 'but I put them to death.' He showed the

sequence in *Dia. 5* as an example. 'Starting with an attachment at Black 1,' explained Cho, 'creates a shape that is very hard to kill. White had no other choice but to go all out for a kill, and the only way to do that is to press down with White 2. But the shape resulting from Black 3, 7, and 9 enables White to live.'



Dia. 5

Disregarding such a simple sequence for life, Cho dropped headlong into a pit.



Dia. 6 1: plays elsewhere

Cho apparently did not realize the dangerous situation he was in even when he played Black 63. White 64 was sente: Black can't omit 65 because of the sequence in *Dia. 6*. White can link up his trapped stones on the right side with his stones above by attaching with 2. If Black resists with 3 and 5, White can link up from above with 8.


White 66 sealed the fate of the black group. Cho probably did not realize that his group was now dead. He quickly played Black 67, which was the second losing move. Any hope of winning now evaporated. Lee thought for 5 minutes and 40 seconds before pushing with White 68, then took another 6 minutes and 13 seconds for White 70. The attachment of White 72 was played swiftly.

Suddenly, Cho's face, which had so far been bright and optimistic, turned dark and gloomy. He must have realized that the huge black group was now irreversibly dead. For 40 minutes Cho looked for a way out. At one o'clock, the appointed time for the lunch break, Cho just kept on sitting, pondering the position. Quietly, Lee pulled himself away from the board and headed towards the dining room; Cho remained glued to his seat.

Cho's reaction was understandable. A single bad move reversed an almost certain win into another humiliating defeat. In such a situation, anyone would surely lose his appetite.


The game recorder also left the game room. All alone, Cho kept mumbling to himself, 'Any ordinary sequence would have been all right, but I let them die.'

He kept staring at the board and mumbling to himself. Two times the game officials came in to urge Cho to go to lunch. Finally, at 1:12, Cho got up from his seat and followed the game official to the dining room.




Dia. 7

Going back to Black 67, the final losing move, if Black plays 1 in *Dia. 7* instead, the sequence to Black 11 can be expected. If White plays elsewhere, Black will play at A and White must keep Black from escaping by playing at B, but Black can then easily live at the top. Thus, the exchange of the marked stones in *Dia. 8* could also be expected; that is, White will play B and Black will defend at A.



Dia. 8

According to Yang Jae-ho, White might cut with 1 in *Dia. 8*, and set up a ko with the sequence to Black 10. Although White risks nothing in this ko fight, Black is the first to take the ko. He has some big ko threats at the bottom, starting with C, whereas White has very few; Black will probably win this ko. Even if Black connects at 2 in *Dia. 9*, the result to White 11 would be similar to that of *Dia. 8*.




Dia. 9

When the game resumed in the afternoon Cho played Black 73 after three minutes more thought. Adding up the time before the lunch recess, the official game record recorded 43 minutes and 5 seconds. If the extra 12 minutes Cho stayed in his seat during the lunch recess were added, the actual time spent on this move would be over 55 minutes.

Alas, White played 76 on the edge and linked up to his stones on the left; the entire black group was dead.

Any other move besides Black 73 would also result in the death of Black's group. To give just one example, if Black plays 1 in *Dia. 10*, White 2 is sente, and White can also link up along the edge with 8 after the sequence to Black 7.



Dia. 10

Fifteen minutes after the lunch recess, the game was over. Cho was probably aware of the result during the lunch break, but perhaps he needed some time to cool off to face the shock of having suffered three upsets in a row.

The referee, Yoon Ki-hyun 9-dan, trying to lighten the atmosphere, said, 'This must be the shortest game on record. It makes my job easy.'

'I hope it does,' responded Cho icily.

Lee Chang-ho now needed only one more win to defend his Wangwi title.

Black resigns after White 90.

(From *Paduk Weekly*. Translated by Yonny Cho.)

Game Four

Black: Lee Chang-ho Wangwi

White: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan

Played on July 21, 1997.

Lee Chang-ho arrived at the Korean Go Association for this game wearing faded blue jeans and a T-shirt. Whether he was aware of the on-going criticisms against the too-liberal dressing habits of younger go professionals was anybody's guess.





Figure 1 (1-38)

Figure 1 (1-38). A new move

Lee played on the star point, then made a corner enclosure at the bottom because he had a new move he wanted to try. Black momentarily switched to the left side with 7, then came back to continue his operations on the right with the checking extension of 9. It will later become clear that it was correct not to make the Black A-White B exchange.

After White jumps to 12, Black makes the large knight's extension to 13. This was the new move Lee was aiming to play. The joseki usually followed is the sequence to Black 7 in Dia. 1.



Dia. 1

Regardless of the pros and cons of the many new moves that Lee plays, everyone is impressed by his continuous experimentation. Looking back over the years since Lee emerged as a top-rank player in 1990, almost all new moves that arose in Korean tournaments were played by him. This is another reason the go world watches Lee's games with such keen interest.

Cho invaded the 3-3 point with White 14. No professional would slide to 18 with 14 and allow Black to stabilize his position with 14.

Black 23 was a strong move, since it leaves two cutting points at C and D. It would seem more reasonable for Black to draw back to D instead of 23. But Lee showed his determination to tightly confine White to the corner, challenging his opponent to cut.

Cho responded with White 24. This aims at the cut at C, so it is much stronger than it first appears.

Black 27 and 29 were equally strong moves. At this stage in the game, pattern or shape is not Lee's immediate concern. More pressing for him is to visualize the overall development.




Figure 2 (39-104)

44: at 39; 59, 65, 71, 77, 82: ko at 53;
62, 68, 74, 80: ko at 52

Figure 2 (39-104). A fierce ko fight


The small spark dropped by Lee in Figure 1 caught on and turned into a brush fire. As a result of merely playing a large knight's instead of small knight's move, an incredibly complex fight is set up.

Black cut at 39, starting an all-or-nothing attack. When White cut at 52, it seemed that Black had overstretched himself. But at this critical moment Lee played the brilliant moves of Black 53 and 55. When White extended to 56, pressing down with Black 57 was the correct way to play. If Black takes the ko instead, White will extend to 57 and Black's position will collapse. The ko fight looks fierce and dangerous, but both players were aware that it would be settled with an even result.

But both players had to compromise. When Lee played Black 81 as a ko threat, Cho ignored it and connected the ko with 82. Black cut with 83 and the result was a big swap: White took the territory at the top and Black captured some stones on the right side.

The pros watching the game thought that this swap favored Black. A simple comparison showed that the right side is as big as the top.

Moreover, Black had captured two stones at 48 and 60. But this analysis was flawed. When White played 84, all opinions changed. If Black answered 84 with 99, White's stones on the right side could escape by jumping to 86. Therefore, Black had to play 85.



Dia. 2

White 86 was a sacrifice which enabled White to make a solid connection at 94. Black had no choice but to let White live in the corner. Black 1 to 5 in Dia. 2 is unreasonable. White's stones will escape after White 6.




Figure 3 (105-159)

Figure 3 (105-159). Missing an easy win

Black suffered a lot of damage; it was nearly catastrophic. Lee's new move at Black 13 in Figure 1 was an ambitious strategy, but
(Continued on page 63)

2nd Tekron Cup: Game Three

Lee Chang-ho vs. Choi Myung-hoon

The top three Korean matches, the Wangwi title, the Tekron Cup, and the Myung-in (Meijin) title, are held from July through September. Immediately after Lee Chang-ho defended his Wangwi title against Cho Hoon-hyun in July, he and Choi Myung-hoon won their way to the final of the Tekron Cup. This was the third big match (40,000,000 won first prize) in which Choi has challenged Lee in less than a year; it was also his third failure. In September last year, he lost to Lee 3-2 in the Myung-in title match, then in January and February he lost 4-2 in the Kisung (Kisei) title match. In this third encounter, in the Tekron Cup, a best-of-five final, he didn't win a single game.

At the age of 22 Choi, who has just been promoted to 6-dan, is certainly one of the top players in Korea, but it seems as if Lee and Cho Hoon-hyun are still one level above him. He is still improving, though, and it is probably only a matter of time before he takes a major title.

Game Three

White: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Black: Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan

Time: 5 hours each; **komi:** 5 1/2 points

Played on August 22, 1997.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *Fighting spirit*

Making a corner enclosure at 14 instead of extending to 13 would have been the peaceful way to play.

Invading with 14 shows fighting spirit. The usual move is to slide to 22.

The pincer of 41 is severe. It gives Black a good game.




Figure 2 (51-100)

78: at 64; 100: at 63

Figure 2 (51-100). *White takes the lead.*

White 52 is an interesting move. It puts Black's advantage in doubt.

White 64 and 66 are tesujis which enable White to make sabaki. With 72 it is now White who has a good game.

Black fights back by starting a ko fight with the sequence from 73 to 77, but when White captures with 80, Black's strategy has failed. Black gets the upper right corner with 85 and 87, but White's stones at the top are alive when he plays 88.

Figure 3 (101-150). *Bad judgment*

The deep invasion of Black 1 showed bad judgment.

Figure 4 (151-198). *White wraps up the game.*

Black 53 at A is unreasonable. It would be answered by White B-Black 60-White 54-Black C-White 66-Black 84-White 76.




Figure 3 (101-150)

Black intercepts three white stones at the bottom right with the sequence from 67 to 75, but this is not enough. After White captures

with 74, Black is clearly behind, with no hope of catching up.

Black resigns after White 198.




Figure 4 (151-198)

28th Myung-in Title

Choi Myung-hoon failed in his bid for the Tekron Cup, but he still had a chance to avenge his loss if he could beat Cho Hoon-hyun in the playoff to decide the Myung-in challenger.

Like the Tekron Cup, the prize to the winner of the Myungin title is 40,000,000 won. The challenger is determined by a series of preliminary knockout tournaments. In the final preliminary, the two survivors play a best-of-three match. This year they were Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan, who challenged Lee for the title last year (he lost 2-3) and Cho Hoon-hyun, Korea's number-two player.

Cho had also suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Lee, so he was just as anxious to face him again in the title match.

In the playoff, Cho won two straight games, thereby earning the right to challenge Lee Chang-ho for the title.

We present here the first game of the playoff.

White: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan

Black: Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan

Time: 4 hours each; **komi:** 5 1/2 points

Figure 1 (1-50). *White takes the lead.*

Instead of White 20, White should play at A, then, after seeing how Black answers, switch to the right side with a pincer at B.




Figure 1 (1-50)

With 31, Black could also play around the star point on the upper side because White would not be able to effectively attack the

black stones on the left side.

Black 33 at 34 would have been better. If White 33. Black would extend to C.

The attachment of White 34, followed by the sequence to 48, was severe on Black.




Figure 2 (51-100)
63: at 57; 66: at 60

Figure 2 (51-100). A ko fight

Black 57 is the tesuji in this position. The white stones in the corner must live by fighting a ko.

Instead of ending the ko with 68, White could have also played an atari at A.




Figure 3 (101-200)

Figure 3 (101-200). The losing move

Black 25 was the losing move: he should have played at 26. After Black 27, the sequence to White 36 was inevitable.

Black 47 was big, but he should have fought back with the hane and connection at 52.

Black's endgame sequence from 69 to 73 was good, but after White 76 Black is unable to catch up.




Figure 4 (201-280)
79: at 44

White wins by 5 1/2 points.

Cho must have been overjoyed when he won the second game of the playoff and got the chance to redeem his honor after his ignominious loss to Lee in the Wangwi title match. However, after losing the first two games (played on August 11 and 20), it seemed as if it was going to be a repeat performance. With these two victories in this title match, Lee had won 20 straight games. These wins included four in the Wangwi title match and three in the Tekron Cup. Lee was on a roll and he seemed unstoppable.

But Cho did what everyone thought impossible. He came back from a two-game deficit and won the next three games, staging a stunning upset to take the Myung-in title, which he held six years ago, from Lee 3-2.

We present the 3rd and 5th games of the title match.

Game Three

White: Lee Chang-ho Myung-in

Black: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan

Time: 5 hours each; komi: 5 1/2 points

Played on September 5, 1997




Figure 1 (1-66)

46: captures two stones at 24

Figure 1 (1-66). Black comes out better.

White 4 is not played often nowadays.

Instead of 48, White must pincer at A, then, after Black 47, play B. White 48 and 50 make a high formation, but Black 51 has become a good move, while White 52 is lukewarm. White must attach at C, then make thickness with the sequence Black D-White 52-Black E-White B-Black F-White G.

Black 55 and 57 are also good moves which result in a swap of the top for the right side. Black comes out better in this exchange.




Figure 2 (67-139)

78: at 70; 81: left of 70; 86: at 89

Figure 2 (67-139). Small moves by Black

Black 57 was small. If White had cut

through with the sequence White A-Black B-White C, White would have taken care of his weakness at the bottom left.

Black 83 was also small. Black should have played at 84. If White D, Black plays at 97 and White is lost. As it turned out, White was able to live in the lower left corner, which is more than he could have hoped for.




Figure 3 (140-231)

Figure 3 (140-231). The losing move

White 40 was the losing move. White can't recover from the counterattack of Black 41. If White pushes at A, Black should be able to prevail in the endgame.

When Black captures two stones with 55, recovery for White is impossible.

White resigns after Black 231.

With the above game, Cho broke his eight-game losing streak against Lee which started with the fourth game of the BC Card Cup (see GW81, page 30).

Game Five

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Cho Hoon-hyun

Played on September 24, 1997.

Figure 1 (1-132). A first time for Lee

It is unusual for Lee to play a moyo strategy with the sanren-sei of Black 1, 3, and 5.

Black 17 at the bottom is the usual way.

Black plays the same joseki in the upper and lower right corners, building a huge moyo on the right side. But with the sequence

from 28 to Black 49, White has successfully reduced Black's moyo. Black 25 and 27 were new moves, but Black got a bad result because of it. Instead of Black 25, defending to the left of 30 would be the normal move.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 2 (51-100). Black recovers.

With the invasion from Black 53 to 67, Black more or less recovers from his setback on the right.

The forcing move of White 92 was well timed.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 3 (101-200). White takes the lead.

Lee was aiming at the ko fight in the upper left corner, starting with Black 1. But he loses his stones there when White resolves the ko with 28. Instead of 27, Black A would have been severer. After this, White takes the lead.




Figure 3 (101-200)

7, 15, 21: at 1; 10, 18, 26: at 4;
22 at the marked stone; 28: at 24

Lee is now in a disadvantageous position. Black plays forcefully with 37 and 39, but White counterattacks with 50 and, up to 64, Black's stones on the upper left side have been captured. If Black had simply extended to 66 instead of 37, he would have had no problem.

After this, 87 was Black's last try for victory, but it was unsuccessful. The game was now decided in White's favor.




Figure 4 (201-300) White 76: at 55

Figure 4 (201-300). A hotly contested game

This was a hotly contested game which lasted for 300 moves and took 11 hours and 52 minutes. Lee's attempts to pull off a reversal were handled skillfully by Cho.

White wins by 5 1/2 points.

Chinese Tournaments

10th Mingren League

There are so many strong young players emerging in China that it is hard to keep track of them. Our regular readers are surely familiar with Chang Hao, and we have presented games of Wang Lei 6-dan, who captured Ma Xiaochun's Monarch title, and Zhou Heyang 6-dan. In this issue we are going to introduce Luo Xihi who is only 20 years old. He appeared in 11th place with 2,555 points in the rankings of Chinese players in *Go World 80*. He is now in 8th place with 2,600 points (see page 6.) Part of the reason for the big jump in his rank is that he has earned the right to challenge Ma Xiaochun for the Mingren (Meijin) title by winning all five of his games in the six-player league. What is especially impressive about Luo's history as a go player is that this is the second time he has challenged Ma for this title, the first being in 1994 when he was only 17 years old. His challenge failed, but it was a respectable showing: he forced Ma to go the distance in the best-of-five title match by winning two of the games.

Below we present two of Luo's games from the league.

White: Luo Xihi 6-dan

Black: Zhang Wendong 9-dan

Played on August 6, 1997.




Figure 1 (1-54)

Figure 1 (1-54). A large-scale move.

Ma Xiaochun, who was watching the game, commented that Black 25 at 26 would be a large-scale move. If White then played at 25, blocking at Black A would be good. However, keeping White confined with 25 is not bad either.

Black 33 at B is better because White 43 is a big hane. This is painful for Black.

Black goes all out for victory with the invasion of Black 45. However, he should have first peeped at C.




Figure 2 (55-111)

Figure 2 (55-111). Black lives at the bottom.

Because of 56, White's shape in this local area becomes somewhat bad, but he is aiming at the bottom. Moreover, when White jumps to 74, he gives support to his stones on the right side. The sequence from Black 61 to White 88 is what can be expected in this position.

Black 89 is a probe. If White answered this move by playing at A, he would suffer a big loss of territory in the corner. However, because of 89, Black 97 and 103 enable Black to make eyes for his group at the bottom. Black successfully settles his group at the bottom when he plays 111. If Black 111 at B, White C would become sente.




Figure 3 (112-155)

Figure 3 (112-155). A fierce fight in the center

White 12 was not good. This move would be more effective at 13.

With Black 17 and 19, the game turns in White's favor. From 23, Black struggles fiercely to save his group in the center.




Figure 4 (156-180)

Figure 4 (156-180). Black's stones die.

White 56 reduces Black to one eye. Black goes through the motions of trying to make a second eye, but it is hopeless and his big group in the center dies.

Black resigns after White 180.

White: Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan

Black: Luo Xihi 6-dan

Played on August 8, 1997.

Figure 1 (1-50). Black leaves behind a ko.

Invading with Black 43 is unusual. Normally, Black would want to play an approach move at 48.

After White 50, Black plays on the right, leaving behind a ko in the upper right corner.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 2 (51-101). Black wins the ko.

Because of this ko, it looks as if White's territory in the upper right has been demolished, but, since White will suffer little damage by fighting the ko, it is Black who has come out of this exchange at a disadvantage. Black 51, 53, and 55 are severe moves typical of Luo, but before playing 57, he should have first exchanged Black 65 for White A. This would have given him a decisive lead.




Figure 2 (51-101) ko: at 67

Black won the ko and lived in the upper left corner with 75, but in compensation White got to play 68 and 76.

Instead of Black 87, Black 91 would be the usual move to settle the black group. But because Black stubbornly pushed out with 87 and 89, White was able to leave behind a ko should Black get shut in.




Figure 3 (102-150)
19: left of 16

Figure 3 (102-150). Black wins another ko.

White 2 is a strong move, but the forcing moves of 3 and 5 help Black make sabaki.

Black has no choice but to extend to 11 and attach at 13 in answer to White 10. Otherwise, he would lose his stones at the top. He must also be careful how he captures so as to minimize the number of White's ko threats in anticipation of the ko in the lower right corner.

White 12 confined Black to the lower right corner, and after exchanging 14 for Black 15, White starts the ko with 16.

Black ignores White's ko threat at 20 and ends the ko with 21.

The fighting now shifts to the top. Black 23 is a strong response to White 22.

Figure 4 (151-184). The losing move

If White connected at 75 instead of playing 74, Black could escape with the sequence Black A-White B-Black C.

The fight was a big success for White when he plays 76, but White 78 was the losing move. If White had played at 79 instead, he would have won.




Figure 4 (151-184)

Figure 5 (185-225). Black makes a huge capture.

Black 85 and 87 decide the game. The sequence from White 88 is inevitable and, when Black plays 97, all the white stones at the bottom are dead: Black is 30 points ahead, in spite of his loss at the top.

White A looks like a tesuji to win the capturing race, but Black will not capture; instead, he will extend to B.

White resigns after Black 225.




Figure 5 (185-225)

52nd Honinbo Title Match

Cho Chikun vs. Kato Masao

In our last issue, we presented the first game of this year's Honinbo title match. To complete our coverage, the remaining three games are analyzed here.



Kato Masao makes a suggestion in the post-mortem analysis of Game Four

Game Two

White: Kato Masao, Judan

Black: Cho Chikun, Honinbo

Time: 8 hours each; komi: 5 1/2 points

Played on May 26–27, 1997

Commentary by Yuki Satoshi, 8-dan




Figure 1 (1–16)

Figure 1 (1–16). A splendid jump

White 8 is one of Kato's favorite opening moves. White 16 would have been sente if played before White 12 and 14, but even in gote it was a splendid jump.

Figure 2 (17–34). Cho spies a defense?

Cho thought for an hour and a half before making the obvious move at Black 17. He was probably exploring the variations following the sequence from Black A to White F. This leads to a confusing fight, but one in which the marked white stone might function effectively.

Black 21 forced White to reply with 22 to 26. If Black plays 21 at G, White can ignore it, because he can answer Black H with White I. If White omits 24 and 26, however, Black can play *Dia. 1*, possibly following with Black 'a' and attacking the white group with a ko.

Black would like to play 29 at 34, but is afraid that White won't reply. Cho is a master at defending weak groups, so he had probably spied some clever way for White to get away with ignoring Black 34.





Figure 2 (17-34)



Dia. 1




Figure 3 (35-48)

Figure 3 (35-48). *Cho picks a fight*

When White strengthened his position in the lower half of the board with the marked stone, Black could have been satisfied to play A, followed by White B, but Cho surprisingly invaded at Black 35 and started a fight. The opinion was expressed that White should have played 44 at C, followed by Black D-White 44-Black 45-White 46-Black 47-White E-Black F-White G, but this result favors Black, who lives in sente on the lower side.

Figure 4 (49-63). *Deep reading*

Black wants to play A, but lacks the necessary ko threats. B is another point Black would like to get, if he can finish with the lower side in sente.






Figure 4 (49-63)

Black 51 was backed up by deep reading. If White answers at 56, Black has an easy defense: Black 53-White 61-Black 52-White 60-Black C. Hence White 52 and Black 53, and now White can't block at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If he does, the long sequence in *Dias. 2* and *3* produces a ko that Black wins. White has no threat adequate to offset the loss.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

11: takes ko at 1

Figure 5 (64–100). *White's power is canceled.*

Black came out ahead on the lower side, but White gained power and could still have made a game of it if he had played 64 at 76 or 78, to attack the marked stone without giving Black so much territory in the top right. White should also have played 80 at 82, since Black 83 canceled out White's power in the lower right.





Figure 5 (64–100)

Black played 95 to prevent White A, but he could have spared himself some trouble by playing 1 in *Dia. 4*. White 2 doesn't work, because of Black 3. If White connects at 5, Black cuts at 4 and wins the capturing race. White 96 and 98 gave White one last chance to attack.



Dia. 4

Figure 6 (101–125). *Black keeps the lead.*

White 6 looked natural, but White's best chance of saving the game was to play at 7. If Black replies at 6, White 16 makes it very close. Black will probably answer White 7 at 16, however, and with the weakness at A, White is unlikely to have much success harassing Black's group.




Figure 6 (101–125)




Figure 7 (126–181)

Figure 7 (126–181). *Cho holds the advantage to the end.*

White was losing by about ten points, minus komi, when he resigned. Cho seemed to maintain a small but steady advantage throughout the game, which is an unusual way for him to win.

White resigns after Black 181.

(Abridged from *Kido*, July 1997. Translated by James Davies.)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun, Honinbo

Black: Kato Masao, Judan

Played on June 2-3, 1997.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan




Figure 1 (1-34)

Figure 1 (1-34). Black makes a good start.

Black could have played 13 at 20, followed by White A and Black B, but in any case Kato got off to a good start. Cho himself admitted that it was bad to have to play toward the edge with White 28 and 30, and to have White 20 captured by Black 31 and 33, though of course the truth may have been that this did not bother him a bit.





Figure 2 (35-66)


Figure 2 (35-66). The tide turns.

Black 37 threatened the white group to the left. White just barely managed to live by exchanging 38 for 39, but Black B would still be sente, threatening A. When Cho sealed White 46 to end the first day of play, Kato seemed to be headed for his first win of the series.



Dia. 1

6: connects



Dia. 2

Black 51 was unnecessary, because B was Black's sente, and it gave up the aji of Black 1 to 9 in Dia. 1. Black should have omitted 51 and just played 53, perhaps followed by the moves from White 54 to 56, then Black 60, threatening Dia. 1. In the sequence actually played, White pushed out into the center at 64 and 66, preparing to hane at C, and the tide of the game began to turn. Black would have liked to play 65 at 1 in Dia. 2, but White gets a ladder.

Figure 3 (67-100). Cho chooses the hard way.

White could have pressed his advantage in the center by playing 70 at 100, but Cho rejected this easy course. Perhaps doing things the hard way is what makes Cho so strong. Once White played 70, the sequence through Black 99 followed almost automatically. Next, White could get a ko with A, but he had no good ko threats, so he played 100 to create some.




Figure 3 (67-100)

83: at 69; 84: at 75; 86: connects at 69




Figure 4 (101-136)


8: ko at 2; 10: captures six stones (left of 3)

Figure 4 (101-136). Game-deciding exchange


If Black plays 1 at 3 to stop the ko, White plays 20 and takes control of the center, while Black still needs another move to capture the clump of white stones on the right side. So Black played 1, White started the ko with 2, and, since White now had an excellent ko threat at 6, he won the ko while Black killed another white group with 9 and 11.

When Kato played 69 in Figure 3, he had probably read out this whole sequence up to Black 9 and 11, but Cho seems to have read a little deeper, foreseeing that White 12 to 16 would give him the lead. If Black plays 19 at 20, White pushes on with 2 and 4 in Dia. 3, then plays 6 and wins easily. If Black plays 5

at 'a', White plays 5, followed by the sequence from Black 'b' to 'f', then White 'g', or a move around 'h'.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

This was the reason for Black 19, but White's capture at 20 was huge, and Black had to answer at 21. If Black plays 21 at 1 in Dia. 4, White pushes out with 2 to 6, then switches to 8 and 10 and still wins. The marked white stone makes 'a' a relatively small move for either side.

Figure 5 (137-226). White wins by a wide margin.

The final margin was unexpectedly large, but the game had already been decided. Perhaps the only way to beat Cho is to forget that

you're playing against him and just think about winning the title.




Figure 5 (137-226)

121: connects at 94

White wins by 16 1/2 points.

(Abridged from *Kido*, July 1997. Translated by James Davies.)

Game Four

White: Kato Masao, Judan

Black: Cho Chikun, Honinbo

Played on June 16-17, 1997

With comments by Cho Chikun




Figure 1 (1-31)

Figure 1 (1-31). Black gets the last big point.

Most professionals would have been satisfied with Black's result in the lower left, but not Cho. He spent nearly an hour pondering Black 11 and 13.

Cho: 'I thought about playing Black 13 at A, B, or C, but none of those moves looked definitely good.'

Black 31 took the last large point of the opening. Earlier, White could have played 20 at D, or 28 at E. Cho considered moving Black 23 to 31, to stop White E, but was worried that White would mount a large-scale attack at 27.

Figure 2 (32-62). Cho miscalculates.

The marked white stone and White 40 to 46 were all aimed at the attack of White 48. Cho had thought that before extending at 61, he could play Black 1 in *Dia. 1* and cut White apart with 3 to 7, but White will answer Black 1 at 2 in *Dia. 2*. After White 6, Black is in trouble because White 46 breaks the ladder at 'a'.





Figure 2 (32-62)




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Cho: 'The result wasn't at all what I had in mind. I should have played Black 55 at 1 in *Dia. 3*. Kato said he was planning to answer with White 3 instead of 2, but then Black

connects at 'a' and White has cutting points at 'b', 4, and 5, so Black can manage easily.'



Dia. 3




Figure 3 (63-71)


Figure 3 (63-71). White lends a helping hand.

Black wanted to play 69 immediately, but White would have answered at 65, so Black played 63 and 65 instead. White 64 prevented the Black A-B combination. After White 66, Black faced a difficult choice.

Cho: 'Black 1 in Dia. 4 is very dangerous, because of White 6. Black might get captured (Black 'a' to White 'f'). I played Black 67 to see what White would do. Depending on how he answered, I might be able to play Dia. 4, possibly swapping the black group in the top left for all the white stones in the bottom left. It would have been a tough decision, but White

made the decision for me by playing 68. This was White's worst choice, because it gave me a perfect chance to play 69, after which Black 71 became inevitable.'

White should have played 68 at 70 or 71.



Dia. 4

Figure 4 (72-89). Black offers a trade.

Having played the marked stone, White had to keep attacking, but some commentators thought he should have played 72 at A.

Cho: 'White A is safer, but Black links up naturally with Black 72, White 80, and Black B. Black can't complain.'

Black 85 and 87 both offered to trade the black group to the left for the white group to the right, a very favorable trade for Black. Black 87 at 89 would have risked losing territory, since White might defend with White C-Black 87-White D.




Figure 4 (72-89)





Figure 5 (90–117)

Figure 5 (90–117). *Black secures victory.*

If White plays 98 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black plays 2, then 4. White's strongest replies are 5 to 9, leaving a ko shape. (If White plays 7 at 8, Black plays 'a'.) Black will now attack the right side, waiting for the right time to start the ko at 'b'.



Dia. 5

Cho: 'I expected White to play this way and take his chances in the ko fight.'

Black 105 to 117 made Black's victory certain.

Figure 6 (118–205). *Nine straight Honinbo titles*

Cho: 'I ended up winning the match 4–0, but it was just luck. In each game there was some small thing that changed the flow, every time in my direction. In this game it was White 68 in *Figure 3*. Just when I thought I had ruined my position, Kato made the wrong choice.'

White resigns after Black 205.

(Abridged from Kido, August 1997. Translated by James Davies.)




Figure 6 (118–205)

It is sometimes commented in the Japanese press that Cho is lucky. But it takes more than luck to hold the Honinbo title for nine consecutive terms and to hold the Kisei and Meijin titles as well. When defending his titles, Cho is playing against some of the best players in the world and, having gained the right to challenge for one of the big three titles, they are probably in top form. Cho certainly makes his share of mistakes, but there is something about his style and the intensity he brings to the go board in these best-of-seven matches, where the games are played over two days, that makes his opponents falter. Go fans everywhere are wondering how long Cho's incredible string of victories will continue and who there is in the Japanese go world capable of stopping him.



Cho looks quite happy after winning his ninth consecutive Honinbo title.

How Strong is Cho?

It is not easy for amateurs to judge just how strong Cho really is. One gauge is to see how well he does giving handicaps to the top amateur players.

Every year after the Honinbo title match, the Amateur Honinbo tournament is held. It has been the tradition since 1963 that the winner of this tournament meets the professional Honinbo in a game called the Professional-Amateur Honinbo Playoff. Since its inception, the professionals have won 25 times and the amateurs ten. The series began with the amateur playing black, but the handicap is changed each year depending on the previous year's result. When Cho became Honinbo in 1989, his opponent Harada Minoru took the black stones and received a 5-point komi. The result was a draw. Since that game, Cho has won every game except one (a three-stone one played against Nakazono Kiyoshi two years ago). In five of those wins he gave the amateur two stones. The handicap for this year's playoff was three stones with Black giving White a komi of 2 1/2 points.

Needless to say, the winner of the amateur Honinbo is strong (equal to a mid-dan professional), so for Cho to defeat such a player at three stones is considered to be a one-in-a-hundred chance. But this year Cho defied the odds and beat the same Harada Minoru, this year's amateur Honinbo, by 1 1/2 points.

The placement of the handicap stones for these games is unconventional: Black can place them wherever he wants. Harada put two stones on the star points on the right side and a stone at takamoku (the 5-4 point) in the lower left corner.

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Harada Minoru Amateur Honinbo

Handicap: three stones; komi: White receives 2 1/2 points; time: 1 hour and 10 minutes
Played in Tokyo on December 7, 1997.

Figure 1 (1-89). A desperate Cho

It is usual to occupy the empty corner in a three-stone handicap, but with a stone on the 5-4 point, Cho probably wanted to prevent Harada from making a corner enclosure at 1. Black plays on another 5-4 point with 2 and White again approaches with 3.




Figure 1 (1-89)

Cho: 'White 29 went against the flow of the game. It would have been better to fight with the sequence White A-Black B-White C-Black D-White 38. Thoughtlessly playing a joseki was not good.'

Harada: 'Cutting with Black 44 was the natural move, but it induced White to move into the moyo I was building up in the center with 47 and 49. It would have been better to have invaded at 60 directly.'

Still, Black 56 and 58 were good attacking moves which combined well with the invasion at Black 60. The sequence to Black 68 was inevitable, but starting a ko fight by immediately playing at 89 was impossible, so Cho jumped lightly into the corner with 69, leaving the ko at the top in reserve. This kind of play is typical of Cho.

Cho: 'I was desperate. My only chance was to create ko threats so I could fight the ko.'

Harada: 'In answer to White 85, connecting at Black E was the safe way to play. After 86 and 88, Black's position on the right is thin and White now has at least one big ko threat.'

Cho wastes no time and grabs his chance, starting the ko with White 89.

Figure 2 (90-129). Only one good ko threat

Awaji Shuzo 9-dan was giving a commentary on the game as it progressed in a big hall packed with fans of Cho. According to Awaji, Black had to answer the ko threat of White 91, but no matter where Black plays his ko threat, White will ignore it; he must resolve the ko. Black could capture with A and B, but this would not guarantee a win.




Figure 2 (90-129)
93: takes ko (left of 90)

Awaji: 'Black 94 is the best candidate for a ko threat. If White's stones are separated, White will have a difficult game, so answering at 96 seems to be mandatory.'

Nevertheless, Cho resolved the ko by capturing with 95, letting Black split his stones into two weak groups with 96. There wasn't any other choice: he had no more ko threats.

Cho: 'If I have two weak groups, somehow I will make them live. It would be easier to kill just one of my groups.' (laughs) Cho was joking, but this is what actually happened.

Harada: 'Instead of Black 94, I could simply extend to 95, ending the ko, but this was not interesting.'

Harada: 'Black 104 wasn't effective. Connecting at C would have been thick. Black can now aim to attack the white group around D.'

Harada: 'Instead of Black 112, peeping at F was better. If White connects at G, Black plays at 113 and White loses his stones in the center.'

Cho thought for a long time before playing White 113. Black answered with 114.

Cho: 'Going all out with Black 114 is the kind of move a strong player will make, but Black should have played the safe move at E.'

Harada: 'Black 114 was bad. Now White 115 became possible. Black cannot resist at J because of the weakness at C.'

White settles his group and gets a bit of territory as well when he plays 115 and 117.

Harada: 'Connecting at H with Black 116 is better because White's group on the left will lose a liberty.'

Harada: 'Black 120 was careless. Playing this move at I would win easily. The territory at the top would then be secure and the four white stones on the left could not escape.'

Figure 3 (130-200). Black loses endgame points.

Awaji: 'Black should have captured at Black 1 in Dia. 1 instead 34 in the figure. He would then have had a comfortable lead. White rescued all of his groups with the moves from 35.'

Harada: 'Black 46 was terrible. If I played the sequence in Dia. 2, I would be ten points ahead. I intended to play this way, but I was in byo-yomi (overtime) and at the last moment some mysterious force within me moved my fingers to 46. This was the beginning of a series of small slips which led to the loss of the game.' Cho, who is renowned for his endgame play under time pressure, took advantage of these mistakes.

Harada: 'Black 82 was small, worth four points, but playing at 100 instead was worth six points.'





Figure 3 (130-200)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

3: connects (left of 1)

Figure 4 (201–269). *Cho closes the gap.*

Harada: 'Connecting at Black 4 in the figure was small. Even if White cuts at 1 in *Dia.* 3, Black simply connects at 2 and Black's group is safe. If White attacks with 3, Black plays 4 and he is alive. Playing the sequence Black 12–White 13–Black 5 was good.'





Figure 4 (201–269)




Dia. 3

Cho immediately extended to White 5. After Black 6 and 8, White played 9 and 11, taking four more points.

Harada: 'Black 12 was bad. I should play at 1 in *Dia.* 4. If White captures the two stones with 2 and 4, Black plays 3 and 5. White must connect at 6, but Black then starts a ko for the life of the white group below with 7 and 9.'

Harada: 'Black 20 was small. Playing this move at 21 would have been bigger.'

Harada: 'Black 22 also lost points. Playing this move at 25 or 27 was bigger.'



Dia. 4

Black 54 at 61 was better.

When the game was counted, Black was one point ahead on the board, but, with the 2 1/2-point komi, White won by 1 1/2 points.

Cho's victory was a big shock to everyone, especially to Harada. It was no doubt a fluke — it must be remembered that Harada got a draw against Cho in this series eight years ago playing black and receiving a 5-point komi. Still, it goes to show that when playing Cho at any handicap, he will take advantage of all slack moves and grind his way to victory.

Harada: 'Before counting the game, I didn't expect to lose. I don't know why I made so many mistakes in the endgame. My fingers just didn't go the right way. That was probably due to Cho's incredible strength.'

(From a special commentary for *Go World* by Harada Minoru and excerpts from the Mainichi Newspaper.)

The Cover

In 1843 Kuniyoshi published a print (see covers of GW1–4) that was a satire against the government and intended as a protest against the rigid oppressions which the ruling Shogunate was enforcing against the hapless middle and lower classes. In Kuniyoshi's print, the Ground Spider and his demons (see GW62 for the story) are to be seen as representing the spirit of popular revolt, while the sick Raiko is the ineffectual Shogun, and the warriors are the hard-hearted ministers and the Chief Censor. The authorities seized the prints and destroyed the blocks; consequently impressions of the original is very rare.


The print on this issue's cover is a burlesque of Kuniyoshi's print. The 'goblins' in the background are popular actors of the day depicted in roles they have played.

New Moves and New Josekis

The Onadare Joseki: A Professional's Vision of Hell (i)

by O Rissei 9-dan

In two separate games in the second round of the 1997 Fujitsu Cup, a new move occurred in the onadare joseki: the jump to Black 1 in the Figure. In the game between myself and Liu Xiaoguang (Black), I had a stone on the 3-3 point at A instead of the marked white stone. In the other game, between Yuki Satoshi and Chang Hao (Black), Yuki had a stone at B.



Figure

Black 1 is a powerful move, especially with the two black stones on the star points on the right, and it was apparently a secret weapon that the Chinese players had prepared for their unsuspecting opponents.

What were the results? Yuki lost to Chang, but I was able to defeat Liu.

Actually, I played Black 1 ten years ago and even introduced it in a book called *O Rissei's Secret Josekis*. But new studies by Chinese and Korean players have discovered new and difficult variations that have made many pros hesitant to get entangled in this joseki.

Black 1 was first studied extensively about three years ago by the Koreans, but now the Chinese have made some new discoveries. There are many possible moves and one bad play will lead to disaster.

Black 1 is most effective when Black has stones on the two star points as in the figure. In the analysis that follows, we will assume that the marked stone has been played.


First of all, let's look at the moves that lead up to the position in the figure.

Dia. 1 (The onadare joseki)


The sequence to Black 10 shows the moves that lead to the onadare joseki. White can continue by turning inside with 'a' or turning outside with 'b'.

Dia. 2 (Turning outside)

If White turns outside with 1, the sequence to White 7 is inevitable. This is the position reached in the figure before Black plays 1.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 3 (The standard joseki)

Continuing from *Dia. 2*, the sequence from Black 1 to White 4 used to be the standard joseki. White has two forcing moves to choose from: 'a' or 'b'.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Variation)

Black could also atari with 1 before descending to 3. White still has the two forcing moves at 'a' or 'b'.

Dia. 5 (White loses a move)


The reason Black 1 is so interesting is that it denies White these two forcing moves. If White forces with 2 and 4, Black engulfs the three white stones with 5 and White must come back to defend the top with 6. Compared with *Dia. 3*, Black has played a move at 1, but hasn't had to play at 'a' to catch the three white stones. Black has gained a move!



Dia. 6 (Three variations)

After Black jumps to 1, White has no choice but to atari with 2 and crawl to 4. Black 5 is now necessary. White has three ways to continue: he can take the corner with 'a' or 'b', or he can crawl to 'c'.


In none of the professional game records from Korea collected by the editorial department of the Nihon Ki-in is there an example of White 'b'. Nevertheless, it is still a strong response. In fact, it was played in June 1997 in the second round of the Samsung Cup by Kim In 9-dan. This might indicate that it is being subjected to rigorous analysis by the Koreans. In this issue, we will look at White 'a' and 'b', and leave White 'c' to the next issue.



Theme Diagram 1

Theme Diagram 1

In response to White 1, Black 2 and 4 cannot be omitted. Next, White must secure the corner with 5.




Dia. 1 (A one-move approach ko)

If White omits 5 in the *Theme Diagram* and jumps to 'a', Black can create a ko in the corner with the sequence to White 11. Although this is a one-move approach ko, Black risks nothing by setting it up. On the other hand, White stands to lose the entire corner.

Dia. 2 (White 2 is the vital point)

As soon as the corner is settled, Black might make shape with 1 or 'a'. Next, White 2, attacking the three black stones, is the vital point. Black answers with 3, but —




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Black is confined to the side.)

White presses Black against the side with the sequence to 7. The marked white stone is well placed in this attack, so Black must live in gote with the sequence to 12. When White extends to 13, he has achieved a great success.

Dia. 4 (Black plays the vital point)


In this position, Black must jump to 1. If White plays the sequence to 6, Black extends to 7. White's stones are floating in the center, providing Black with a good target.



Dia. 4

Dia. 5 (Another way)

What happens if White plays 1 and 3? (If White 3 at 'a', Black will attach at 3.) Black 2 and 4 are best. White 'b' and 'c' seem to be White's only responses.



Dia. 5


Dia. 6 (White's stones have been split apart)

If White extends to 1, Black 2 forces White to answer at 3. Black now escapes into the center with 4. White is left with two weak groups; Black should be able to capture at least one of them.


Dia. 7 (The diagonal move)

The diagonal move of 1 is White's best chance. The sequence to Black 8 was played in the game between Yuki Satoshi (White) and

Chang Hao, in the Fujitsu Cup game, mentioned in the introduction to this article. When White makes shape with 7, Black jumps lightly to 8. This result is good for Black.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 8 (severe)

Wedging in with 2, then squeezing with 4 and 6, is the severest way for Black to play. The sequence to Black 10 is inevitable. White is left with a clump of stones that is short of liberties. If these stones try to escape, the two black stones on the right are lying in wait. This variation was pointed out by Lee Chang-ho in another game.




Dia. 8

7: connects at 2

Dia. 9 (White's resistance)


White 1 is another way for White to resist, but Black again makes shape with 2. After Black 6, White jumps to 7 and Black takes up a position on the left with the extension to 8. Again, White's stones are floating in the center without a base.



Dia. 9

Dia. 10 (An example game from Korea)

The variation in Dia. 9 occurred in a game between Seo Bong-soo 9-dan (Black) and Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan. Before jumping to 9, Black peeped with 7. This induced a fierce but even fight after the sequence to Black 13.




Dia. 10

Dia. 11 (Not good for Black)


Black must be careful about White 1. If he ataris with 2, White will extend to 3. If Black next connects at 'a', White will capture the two stones at the top with 'b'. This is not good for Black.

Dia. 12 (Also not good for Black)

Connecting at Black 2 is a good move, but the hane of 4 leads to failure. White 5 forces Black to answer at 'a' and White again catches the two black stones at the top with 'b'.




Dia. 11




Dia. 12

Dia. 13 (Good for Black)

After White 3 in Dia. 12, the correct move is for Black to extend to 1. The sequence to Black 15 is inevitable. With the two black stones on the star points on the right, White will be at a severe disadvantage in the fighting that follows.



Dia. 13




Theme Diagram 2

Theme Diagram 2

Turning inside with White 1 is the next variation. There have been few examples of this move in tournament play, but I have heard that it is undergoing intensive analysis in China. The sequence to White 7 is inevitable. After this, there are many variations, with

many ways to slip up. With correct play, White can expect an even fight. Black 'a' and 'b' are the main lines.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (The aji in the corner)

Black's four stones in the corner are dead, but they still have aji, so Black 1 is sente. White can answer with 2 or 'a'. Black 'b' is also sente, but the marked stone is troublesome. At the top, Black 'c' is the move to make good shape.

Dia. 2 (White has a good position)

Both sides are aiming for the vital point of Black 1, but White will be happy to settle the top with 2. Black has no other way but to respond with 3, enabling White to take the strategic point of 4 and get a good position.




Dia. 2

Dia. 3 (A tolerable loss)

Black 1 works well with the two star-point stones on the right. The sequence to White 10 can be expected. Unfortunately, Black has lost his three stones on the left, but with his influence extending from the top right, this loss is tolerable. In any case, Black 1 is a manly move.


Besides Black 3, are there any other moves?



Dia. 6 (Unreasonable for Black)


Instead of Black 9 in *Dia. 3*, can Black prevent the capture of his three stones on the left by exchanging 1 for White 2, then attaching with 3?

In response, White will force with 4 and 6, then attack the black stones on the left with 8 and 10. After White 12, the black stones are dead. This variation is unreasonable for Black.



Dia. 6

In conclusion, when White turns into the corner with 1 in *Theme Diagram 2*, the best result Black can get is the sequence to White 10 in *Dia. 3*.



Dia. 7

*Kim In (White) vs. Liu Chen
2nd Samsung Cup*

Dia. 7 (A good result for White)

To conclude this installment, let's look at the game between Kim In 9-dan (Korea) and

Liu Chen 7-dan (China) that was played in the 2nd Samsung Cup in June 1997.

After Kim turned into the corner with the marked white stone, Liu blocked with 1, forcing White to defend the corner with 2. Black engulfed the white stones with 3 and 5, while White staked out the left side with 4 and 6.

If I were playing White, I would have tightly confined the black stones with 'a' to make sure that they wouldn't escape.

If Black 1 at 'b' and White responds with 4, the sente move of Black 'c' still remains after Black 5.

In the next instalment, we will examine White 'c' in *Dia. 6* on page 58.

(Kido, September 1997. Translated by the editor.)

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The 31st Wangwi Title Match

(Continued from page 37.)


Cho defended brilliantly and came out of the fight with the advantage.

Black 5 and 7 were less than satisfactory, but they were Black's best chance.

Black's influence from the lower right towards the center may seem substantial, but White could easily spoil it by attaching at A. Black B will be met by White C. Because of this Black could not jump to 36, so he played 7 instead. Black is clearly at a disadvantage.

Switching to White 8 showed Cho's excellent positional judgment. Allowing White to turn at 9 would be too painful for Black, so he had to play at 9 himself. After the jump of White 12, a previously insignificant region had been transformed into a respectable formation. One commentator, Chang Soo-yong 9-dan, praised Cho's moves here.

White builds thick shape with the moves from 16. White now plays 34 and 36 in sente, establishing a clear advantage. However —



Dia. 3

Lee fought back by attaching at Black 37. He had no alternative but to try to throw the game into a free-for-all fight. White could respond in a natural way with 2 in *Dia. 3*, but Cho went all out and attacked with 38, 40, and 42. Lee counterattacked on a grand scale.

Black 43 kept up the tension. The attachment of White 44 was the losing move. If White had simply made a hane at D, he would have easily won. But Cho chose the most difficult response. The players analyzing the

game in the pressroom considered it a bad omen. If Lee faced this same situation, he would surely have terminated the game with the simplest moves. But winning a won game is Lee's forte.

Eventually, Black 51 ensured that all of Black's stones would be connected. Up to 58, White accomplished nothing. Black 59 was now a superb move, receiving endless praise. The reason it was so strong was that it threatened either to make two eyes for his group on the left or to link up with these stones.




Figure 4 (160–200)

88: at 80

Figure 4 (160–200). An unbelievable reversal


After thinking for a long time, Cho retreated with White 60. If White cut through with 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black would play the sequence to 10 and White would lose his stones in the center.

Lee cut with Black 61, tempting White to escape at A, but the three marked white stones are captured nonetheless. The game now took a strange turn.

Cho counterattacked with White 62, setting up the final decisive fight.

After playing 71 and 73 in sente, Black 75 showed Lee's fighting spirit. But then Cho jumped to White 78 and set up a big ko fight with 80 and 82.

The ko is huge, so a medium-size ko threat would be ignored. Cho ignored Lee's ko threat at Black 89, resulting in another big swap.



Dia. 4

Which side profited from this ko fight after White 92? According to Chang Soo-yong, White gained a few points from this exchange and he was now leading by a couple of points.




Figure 5 (201-273)

5: ko (below 2); 36: connects (below 10);
49: at 2; 55: below 53


Figure 5 (201-273). A half-point win for Lee

Three fierce battles were fought during this game. The first started with Lee's new move at Black 13 in Figure 1 and Cho came out on top. Then on the left side another fight broke out in which Cho slipped up and it became an even game. The third fight took place at the bottom, where Cho came up with a brilliant counterattack, putting him back in the lead.

Everyone in the pressroom expected Cho

to win. However, Lee pulled off a miraculous half-point upset.

White's extension to 12 was the losing move. White expected Black to respond at 14, but Black sealed off the three circled white stones and made a huge territory in the center.



Dia. 5

White should have played 12 at 1 in Dia. 5, making the points 6 and 7 miai. If Cho had played this way, he could not have lost.

For the second time in this series, Lee came from behind and won by half a point. Everyone marvels at how Lee continuously pulls off these half-point upsets. Not only is he a master at winning won games, he is also a master at winning lost games.

In the tense atmosphere following Cho's failed challenge, no one dared to break the silence. But as soon as Cho withdrew from the game room, the press corps surrounded Lee and bombarded him with questions.

273 moves. Black wins by half a point.

(From *Paduk Weekly*. Translated by Yonny Cho.)

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